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The purpose of this study was to determine whether there are any significant decreases in
the safety and effectiveness of pilots by age 60. The data for this study came from records
of general aviation accidents (i.e., for private pilots, commercial pilots, and air transport
pilots), and airline accidents (Part 121). These accident data were acquired from many
specialized aviation data banks; these include: NTSB, AOPA, FAA, and the COMSIS
Research Corporation. The data were organized into groups according to the ages of the
pilots-in-command responsible for the accidents. Groupings progress in five-year
increments starting at 20-24, and ending with 55-59. The data were analyzed in terms of
both accidents per 1,000 pilots and accidents per 100,000 annual hours flown. The results
indicate that age and experience both affect safety. The magnitude of these effects and their
implications on flight safety are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION

Aging ultimately plays a dramatic and significant role in a pilot's ability to fly an
aircraft safely and efficiently. But just how early do these effects manifest? At what point
in a pilot's career do they become operationally significant? Past research on the effects of
aging on aviators has noted progressive deteriorations in physiological and psychological
functions with increasing age. In an early study, Shriver (1953) focused on the effects of
aging on aviators and found that physical abilities, motivation and the ability to improve
skill and technique, and aircrew performance lend to decline with age. In the same light,
Gerathewohl (1978a) noted that the aging process is characterized by progressive
deteriorations in both physiological and psychological functions.
Aviators have a number of tasks to execute in their environment, especially those
who operate large complex jetliners that employ the latest technologies. One report (Select
Committee on Aging, 1979) noted that an aviator's ability to perform highly skilled tasks,
to adapt to new and changing conditions, to process incoming information, to resist
mental and physical fatigue, to maintain physical stamina, and to perform efficiently in a
complex and often stressful environment begins to decline early in middle life and
continues to deteriorate from that point on. However, Mohlcr (1981) refuted that
judgment and reasoning tend to be preserved and may compensate for some of these
losses. Nevertheless, these too are eventually eroded by the aging process.
The process of aging is a very complex matter. The literature indicates that there
are significant variations in performance, abilities, and tolerances among individuals of the
same chronological age (Braune & Wickcns, 1984; Gerathewohl, 1978b; Institute of
Medicine [IOM], 1981; Shriver, 1953). Hcrtzog (1985) noted that not all people age at
1
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the same rate or decline by the same amount. Almost all of the physiological and
psychological data that we now have show an increasing variability with age, meaning that
age alone progressively loses its predictive effectiveness. This finding has become one of
the most distinguishing characteristics of cross-sectional studies of aging (Rodin, 1987).
Despite these variations among individuals, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) enforces an upper age limit of 60 years of age for U.S. airline pilots. All other
pilots not flying under these particular types of operations are not affected by this
regulation. One report (General Accounting Office [GAO], 1989) found that a total of 67
petitions for exemption on behalf of 418 pilots have all been denied since the
implementation of this regulation. There has also been some debate as to whether or not
it is fair to enforce this rule for airline pilots without the possibility of waivers or special
exemptions (also known as special issuances).
There are both positive and negative aspects associated with this age limit rule.
Some issues are not closely tied to questions of science. For example, the rule eliminates
some of the most highly paid salaries to senior captains and becomes economically
advantageous to an airline. In addition, it is easily enforced since it only requires the
FAA and individual airlines to monitor a pilot's age. Lastly, it eliminates these so-called
age decrement problems before any major deteriorations in health or performance are
likely to affect flight safety.
On the other hand, enforcing this rule on the basis of age alone is clearly a form of
age discrimination. But, is it economically practical to determine which pilots beyond age
60 retain their skills and capacities and which pilots do not? If all the enhanced medical
screening procedures and technologies were used, the average annual cost for a first class
medical exam would increase from $300 to over $1000 (Office of Technology
Assessment, 1990). It should be noted thatfirstclass medical certificates are only
required for those airline pilots who serve as pilol-in-command (PIC); e.g., the captain.
In the same respect, the rule may aggravate the serious shortage of qualified pilots that the
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U.S. airline industry is anticipating. Additionally, one must be aware of the possible
inconsistencies when medical exemptions are granted to younger and less qualified pilots
for problems which are potentially as threatening to safety as aging alone.
The FAA is responsible for promoting aviation safety; therefore, it is supposed to
regularly re-examine the medical and scientific advancements that may affect this age
regulation (GAO, 1989). Inconsistencies in the safety levels of older pilots as reported
by various studies make the rule even more controversial; e.g., using the two highest
experience categories, Serwer (1990) found the accident rate for older pilots (60-69 years
old) to be almost three times less than those rates for younger pilots (20-29 years old);
whereas Golaszewski (1983) found the accident rate for older pilots to be higher than the
younger pilots' rate, suggesting that older pilots are likely to be less safe. Why? Is this
because the performance capabilities of pilots decline as they grow older, or can these
age-related changes be attributed to other factors? It should be apparent that this is a very
complex issue with many details and requires an objective data based conclusion.
Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this study is to determine whether the available data indicate that
there are any significant decreases in the safety and effectiveness of pilots by age 60; e.g.,
the incidence of accidents increases as a function of age. Do older pilots pose a greater risk
due to either sudden incapacitation or undetected decrements in physical or mental
performance? If so, at what age? Does the current arbitrary age limit for airline pilots
achieve the system's purpose of maximizing safely?
Review of the Related Literature
It is clear that a better understanding of the aging process and its effects on flight
safety is needed. A large proportion of the literature reviewed supports the hypothesis of
a progressive decline in abilities with advancing age. However, there are some recently
published reports that suggest that the data on aging needs to be reanalyzed and/or reevaluated. For example, Labouvic-Vicf (1985) noted that the very concept of aging is

undergoing a shift in theoretical emphasis. Labouvie-Vief indicated that the question, "Is
there decline in aging per se?" may no longer be the most useful one to pose (p. 501).
Additionally, we need to recognize the myths and stereotypes typically associated with
the aging process. Eisdorfer (1985) reported on the mythologies of aging and noted that
the first myth of the aging process is that age brings with it a series of functional declines
and decreases a person's ability to be productive. The second myth is that one's ability to
perform a given task decreases as we grow older. The work of these writers suggests
that it may be diseases that are more common in the elderly population that affect safety
rather than age per se.
Physiological Effects of Aging
Gerontological studies prior to the 1960s were based on older subjects taken from
hospitals, nursing homes, and other institutional settings (Mohler, 1981). Until recently,
as reported by Rodin (1987), research on aging has only emphasized the losses associated
with the aging process. However, in a break from tradition, Rodin noted that we know
biological vulnerabilities associated with old age are capable of being reduced or made less
severe. Likewise, Bortz (1980) found that many changes commonly attributed to aging
can be retarded by an active exercise program. Thesefindingsare repealed in a number of
reports that attest to the benefits of exercise in various human disease states (Bruce &
Fisher, 1987; Fox & Haskell, 1968; Hellerstcin, Hornslen, Goldbarg, Burlando,
Friedman, Hirsch, & Marik, 1967; Mohler, 1982; The Medical Study Group, 1988).
The physiological literature indicates that there usually are physical decrements in
vision with increasing age (Corso, 1987; Edwards, 1990; Eisdorfer, 1985; Fozard, 1990;
Gault, 1990; IOM, 1981; Kline & Schiebcr, 1985; Sanders & McCormick, 1987;
Shriver, 1953). Gault noted that the pupils tend to become smaller, especially after 60,
therefore restricting the amount of light available for proper eye functioning. Likewise,
Kline and Schieber found that the decline in dark adaption appears to be particularly
marked after age 60. In terms of quickness, the older eye adapts to the dark the same as
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the younger one; however, it does not attain the high level of sensitivity (i.e., more light
is needed to perform a given task). Gault also noted that a pilot of 60 might need ten
times the amount of light than a 25-year-old. However, the role of eyeglasses and
cockpit lighting are issues relevant to this topic, but require further study. Other research
(Mohler, Bedell, Ross, & Veregge, 1967) analyzed accidents involving pilots over 60
and found that more than 51% of the accidents occurred during the landing phase of
operations, where eye-sight is critical. However, Mohler et al. did not report the
percentage of accidents during the landing phase for younger pilots; thus it is not possible
to assess the significance of their findings on a comparative basis.

#

The literature also suggests that there arc age-related declines in audition with
advancing age (Corso, 1987; Edwards, 1990; Fozard, 1990; IOM, 1981; Olsho &
Harkins, 1985; Ribak, Hornung, Karl, Froom, Wolfstein, & Ashkcnazi, 1985; The
Medical Study Group, 1988; Von Gierke & Nixon, 1971). Corso indicated that the two
primary factors that produce hearing deficits are age and noise. The Medical Study Group
noted that hearing impairment is inevitable with advancing age, particularly in the higher
frequency range (i.e., above 1,000 Hz). These hearing changes are often characterized as
progressive and irreversible. Presbycusis is the term most widely used to refer to agerelated changes in hearing ability. Olsho and Harkins noted that presbycusis is one of the
major sensory changes associated with aging in humans. Nonetheless, some
compensatory devices (e.g., hearing aides, volume controlled headsets) may adequately
compensate for this age-related change, but this too requires further study.
Does a hearing disability have any operational significance to pilots in a crew
environment? If the loss is significant, can it slip through the recurrent Line Oriented
Flight Training (LOFT) sessions and first class medical examinations? In light of the
latter question, Reinhart (1991) reported that pilots intentionally seek out the easiest
medical examiner to avoid learning more than they really want to know; thus, in terms of
pilot health, what the public expects and what the public gets may be two different things.
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The most important aspect of hearing for pilots is the ability to understand speech
and to distinguish between the different types of warning signals, especially in a noisy and
sometimes stressful cockpit. However, Szafran (1969) found no evidence of any
discrepancy in the ability to recognize a signal from a background of white noise with
subjects between 40 and 60 years of age. Although some literature suggests that declines
in hearing occur at all adult age groups, not just the old, the IOM (1981) report found that
80% of people with hearing problems are over 45, and nearly 55% are 65 or older.
Although these age-related declines in audition have been widely reported, the relevance of
these changes to the pilots' job performance has not yet been established.
Psychological Effects of Aging
As people grow older, physiological and psychological changes inevitably take
place. One of the least disputed and most pronounced findings in the gerontological
literature is the slowing in cognitive processing that occurs with advancing age (Braune &
Wickens, 1984; Gilbert & Levee, 1971; Hartley, Harker, & Walsh, 1980; Morrow,
Leirer, & Yesavage, 1990; Reese & Rodeheaver, 1985; Salthouse, 1985; Spilich, 1983).
This slowing in cognitive abilities has a number of closely related functions. The
literature indicates that reaction time, attention, memory, problem solving, decision
making, and intelligence, for the most part, tend to decline with increasing age, and have
applications in the operational aspects of piloting an aircraft.
Several studies note that as we become older, reaction time has a tendency to slow
down (Braune & Wickens, 1984; Braune, Wickens, Strayer, & Stokes, 1985; Cann,
1990; Craik & McDowd, 1987; Eisdorfer, 1985; Fozard, Vercruyssen, Reynolds, &
Hancock, 1990; Gault, 1990; IOM, 1981; Murrell, 1970; Salthouse, 1985; Shock,
Greulich, Andres, Arenberg, Costa, Lakatta, & Tobin, 1984; Simon, 1967; Vercruyssen,
Carlton, & Diggles-Buckles, 1989; Wilkinson & Allison, 1989). It is probably one of the
only aging effects that researchers have no disagreement over (Tsang, 1989). Gault noted
that a younger person can react more quickly and strongly to urgent situations than can his

7
older counterpart. However, older persons who retain response quickness do compete
well with younger individuals. But how well? It may be true that a slower reaction time
might be critical in the landing phase during which a number of tasks must be carried out
rapidly. Nevertheless, Braune and Wickens suggested that a reasonable explanation for
this reduction in response time could be attributable to a more conservative response, thus
the responses are slower but more accurate. Additionally, Murrell found that reaction time
could be improved with practice, regardless of age, but older individuals require much
more practice than the younger subjects, whose performance improved immediately.
On one hand, Eisdorfer (1985) asks whether or not a few milliseconds difference
in time between an older and younger pilot has any practical significance. Eisdorfer
contemplated whether the small changes in speed are more or less offset by the fact that
the older pilot, having experienced many different adverse situations in the cockpit, would
be able to judge each situation and perhaps deal with it faster? On the other hand, the IOM
(1981) report suggested that there are some situations in airline operations during which a
few hundred milliseconds are operationally significant. The example cited involves a pilot
who has to abort a takeoff (e.g., engine out, engine fire, blown tire). This condition
requires complex decision-making and a very short reaction time; and the slightest
hesitation could result in a tragedy.
It should also be asked whether an older pilot might be more easily overloaded in
high workload situations where fatigue is likely to take its toll. Some research (e.g.,
Shriver, 1953; Schreuder, 1966) indicated that the increased susceptibility to mental
fatigue is by far the most frequent type of change reported to occur with advancing age.
It has also been noted (Higgins, Mertcns, McKcnzic, Funkhouser, White, & Milburn,
1982) that fatigue can adversely affect not only the accuracy, but also the timeliness in
performance. Other research (Collins & Mertcns, 1988; Mertens, Higgins, & McKenzie,
1983) has found a similar relationship—that is, at higher levels of workload,
performance decreased with age.
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Botwinick (1978) noted that there arc two distinctive views when referring to
reaction time. Thefirstis that the general slowness in behavior is only a matter of the
kinesthetics, and is thus of no importance to cognition. Therefore, the variety of tests
which measure timed performance are unfair and inappropriate for testing older
individuals. A contrary view offered by Braune and Wickens (1984) suggested that the
speed of response is, nevertheless, a reflection of the central nervous system functioning
and is most important to cognition. To this researcher's knowledge, there are no
empirical data available that would conclusively support one view over the other.
Attention, like memory and intelligence, is a multifaceted concept. Some research
on aging and attention (e.g., McDowd & Birren, 1990; Stankov, 1988) has subdivided
attention into the following four categories: divided, switching, sustained, and selective.
Of particular importance to pilots are the categories of sustained attention (i.e., similar to
vigilance) and selective attention (i.e., the ability to focus on a task while ignoring
irrelevant aspects). McDowd and Birren noted that sustained attention is the activity of
maintaining performance on a particular task over extended time; and vigilance, as noted in
Botwinick (1978), can be conceptualized as the ability to detect rarely occurring signals
over a prolonged period of time, or simply the efficiency with which small but perceivable
changes in the external environment arc detected (Surwillo & Quilter, 1964).
There have been some reports on age-related changes in vigilance tasks that have
shown somewhat mixed results (e.g., see Surwillo & Quilter, 1964; Quilter, Giambra, &
Benson, 1983). Despite their contradictions, one investigator (Botwinick, 1978)
conducted a thorough literature review and noted that there have been several
investigations of vigilance performance in relation to age, and they all lend to suggest that
vigilance behavior declines with advancing age. A study by Thompson, Opton, and
Cohen (1963) tested 55 male subjects in two age groups, 18-35 and 65-75 years of age.
The results show a marked decrement in vigilance performance in the older subjects; and
the more complicated and demanding the task, the greater the performance decrement.
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The IOM (1981) discussed selective attention and vigilance in their report and noted that
an individual's inability to maintain attention would lead to a decrement in performance
on many tasks, and may even lead to accidents. Additionally, McDowd and Birren
(1990) conducted an exhaustive review of the literature on aging and attention and found
that the overall levels of performance on vigilance tasks appear to be reduced with
advancing age.
Piloting an aircraft, as reported in a letter in Select Committee on Aging (1985),
often requires efficient extraction of information from a broad cluster of relevant and
irrelevant stimuli in which it is embedded. It is necessary for pilots to monitor many
sources of information (e.g., cockpit instruments, weather conditions) and focus their
attention selectively. This selective focusing of attention is probably one of the more
important functions. McDowd and Birren (1990) noted that individuals must filter out
irrelevant information from their environment and select information that is task or goal
oriented. Several studies were reviewed by McDowd and Birren and the prevalent findings
suggest that older adults are more distracted by irrelevant information in visual search tasks
than are young adults. This and other research (e.g., Rabbitt, 1977; Schonfield, 1974)
suggest that older adults seem to have more difficulty discriminating relevant from
irrelevant information. Despite these shortcomings, McDowd and Birren reported that
some other research (e.g., Hoycr & Plude, 1982) has looked at the role of expertise in
visual search tasks. They stated, "Knowing what to look for can speed search, and experts
in particular domains [e.g., airline pilots] can compensate for sensory acquity problems by
knowing which features of a search field are relevant and which are not" (p. 228).
Gilbert and Levee (1971) indicated that nowhere have decrements in cognitive
abilities been more evident than in the area of memory. Memory is often characterized as
a basic human function. It is interrelated with perception, attention, decision making,
judgment, information processing, and many other functions (Edwards, 1990). The
literature on age differences in human memory includes a number of studies comparing
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the performance of young and old adults on a variety of memory tests, and the prevalent
view suggests that there is some decline in memory ability with increasing age
(Botwinick, 1978; Craik, 1977; Craik & Byrd, 1982; Craik & McDowd, 1987; Gilbert &
Levee, 1971; Gordon & Clark, 1974; Hartley, Harker, & Walsh, 1980; IOM, 1981;
Moenster, 1972; Perlmutter, 1980; Perl mutter, Adams, Berry, Kaplan, Person, &
Verdonik, 1987; Poon, 1985; Spilich, 1983).
Patterns of age differences in six subtests of the Guild Memory Test were
presented by Gilbert and Levee (1971) and the results showed a progressive decline in
scores with increasing age. The 50-59 and 60-75 year old subjects showed statistically
reliable decrements as compared to the 35-49 year old group. However, Perlmutter et al.
(1987) concluded that age differences in reports on memory performance have not been
entirely consistent. It appears that the failing memory is both a popular stereotype and a
concern about aging. Younger adults are just as likely to experience memory failures, but
are less concerned than older adults by them; thus, they are not reported as frequently.
Some research (e.g., Perlmutter, 1980; Poon, 1985) has speculated that age merely
increases a person's sensitivity or awareness about memory problems, and may not at all
be related to memory failures. In addition, Perlmutter ct al. suggested that many of the
memory problems that are observed later in life (e.g., recalling recent events, speed of
recall) may be partially caused by factors that tend to be correlated with age, but are not
inevitable consequences of aging. There is, however, a substantial amount of literature on
the possible causes and theoretical paradigms of the changes in memory with advancing
age, but that work is beyond the scope of this study.
Many pilot activities frequently require memory operations. Pilots are often
overloaded with data in flight situations (e.g., communication frequencies, navigation
frequencies, altitudes, clearances, runways) and these memory functions often influence a
pilot's judgment and performance. However, Braune and Wickens (1984) noted that
there are weaknesses in memory that are not realistically controllable by regulation,
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recurrent training, or even therapy. Can such deficits in memory result in a pilot's failure
to detect a hazard or his/her inability to deal with the situation if encountered? In light of
this question, Poon (1985) reviewed more than 200 reports and found that one study
(Perlmutter, 1980) has suggested that although older adults probably have less efficient
memory mechanisms, their rich experiences possibly allow them to perform some tasks at
the same or higher level than younger adults. A similar remark was found in Hawkins
(1987), who suggested that any memory deterioration which does occur may be offset by
increasing experience and knowledge. Pilot experience is examined in a subsequent
section of this study.

#

One report (Gilbert & Levee, 1971) indicated that there is evidence that the various
facets of memory decline at different rates. In the same respect, Craik (1977) found that
not all facets of the working memory are affected by the aging process. The working
memory, also known as the primary memory or short-term store, is conceptualized as a
limited capacity workspace that is used for temporary storage (Edwards, 1990; Leirer,
Yesavage, & Morrow, 1989; Poon, 1985). No doubt, aircraft piloting is highly
dependent on the working memory's capacity (e.g., different performance speeds, fuel
systems, communication frequencies, navigation frequencies, emergency procedures).
According to Leirer et al., many aspects of piloting are so complex that performance is
limited by the working memory's speed or capacity to process rather than the availability
of information for the pilot to use. Other research on the working memory was conducted
by Spilich (1983) who compared young, elderly-normal, and elderly-impaired subjects
whose mean ages were 21, 81, and 82 years of age respectively. The results showed a
statistically significant difference in Wechslcr Memory Scale scores which suggests that
the older subjects are less able to maintain new information in the working memory.
Thesefindingslend evidence to the suggestion that aging could impair a pilot's ability to
update his/her menial model with new information, therefore, limiting the quality of
performance (Morrow, Leirer, & Yesavage, 1990).
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Not all research has demonstrated a clear or consistent age-linked deficit in
memory. The literature reviewed gives contradictory results that may be attributed to
methodological or design issues (e.g., cross-sectional versus longitudinal).
Nevertheless, Hawkins (1987) concluded that the effect of aging on memory varies with
the individual and it is difficult to draw generalizations from the data. Other research
(e.g., Poon, 1985) has suggested that the degree of impairment in memory functions is
highly related to the integrity of the biological system of the older adult. That is, the
healthier the person, the less likely that person will experience memory problems.
Supporting this, research over the last two decades has shown that intense physical
conditioning can partially reverse some of the functional losses that typically accompany
normal aging (Perlmutter et al., 1987). From this, one can reasonably suggest that the
physiological improvements acquired from an active exercise program could also
contribute to improvements in cognitive functioning as well. Thus, physical fitness may
be an important factor to consider when evaluating the memory performance of older
adults. Other factors to consider include practice and item familiarity. Poon noted that
these are powerful variables in reducing age changes and improving the memory
performance of older adults. Therefore, it is reasonable to speculate that these factors
would put the pilot population, particularly well-practiced airline pilots, at a definite
advantage compared to others within their age groups.
Based on the available information, it is logical to infer that many cognitive
processes greatly overlap. For example, Reese and Rodeheaver (1985) indicated that the
memory often influences performance in situations intended to assess competence in other
areas, such as problem solving. Although memory is not in itself a problem solving
ability, it can in fact be an aid to problem solving. From this, we can safely infer that any
variable(s) that interfere with memory (e.g., attention, intelligence) will likely interfere
with problem solving abilities. As in other areas of cognitive performance and aging,
most of the problem solving research is cross-sectional in nature. In addition, Shock et

13
al. (1984) noted that there have only been a few studies that have measured the changes in
problem solving performance with age. One review (Arenberg, 1982) reported that these
studies tend to show age differences with the older subjects performing less well than their
younger counterparts. It is, however, recognized by gerontological investigators that age
and birth cohorts (e.g., education, culture) arc confounded in cross-sectional studies.
This implies that age differences revealed in many of these studies may in fact represent
differences between cohorts rather than decrements due to age.
Without a doubt, flying safe is a mentally demanding task. Pilots sometimes have
to solve problems, divide time between difficult tasks, and exert a strong effort toward
keeping mental control throughout the flight (Edwards, 1990). Reese and Rodeheaver
(1985) reported that problem solving involves assessing the present state, defining the
desired state, and finding ways to transform the former to the latter. It is interesting to
note that Giambra and Arenberg (1980) suggested that there is a large class of problems
that most individuals may not be able to solve until they have had extensive experience
with such similar problems. A classic example is the Sioux City DC-10 accident, in
which the aircraft lost all three hydraulic systems. There were no procedures in the
emergency manual for such an event, so the 58 year old captain had to come up with a
method of his own. The captain maintained the aircraft's directional stability by using
differential thrust. He crash landed his crippled airplane, but his quick thinking and
problem solving ability saved 186 lives (Stephens, 1989).
Decision making, somewhat related to problem solving, refers to the evaluation of
the possible solutions and selecting one to carry out. Salthouse (1990a) indicated that an
essential requirement for pilots is their effectiveness in high-speed decision making.
Some researchers perceive accidents as being related to decisions that bring about
unfortunate or inappropriate responses (Sterns, Barrett, & Alexander, 1985). Reese and
Rodeheaver (1985) noted that any differences observed in decision making or problem
solving performance between elderly and young adults might reflect to a large extent
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cohort differences that introduce confounding variables.
Intelligence, like memory and attention, is not a unitary quality. It is often
categorized into dimensions such as crystallized, fluid, psychometric, and general
intelligence. Of particular importance to the flying environment is that of crystallized and
fluid intelligence. Sterns, Oster, and Newport (1980) noted that crystallized intelligence is
presumed to reflect prior learning and experience (e.g., vocabulary knowledge, general
information); whereas, fluid intelligence, according to Salthouse (1990a), reflects the
efficiency of current processing (e.g., tasks that emphasize speed or accuracy of
associations, decisions, or responses). Intelligence overall is a vital and essential quality of
a pilot for much of his/her successful behavior. Does intelligence decline in old age or does
it remain unaffected as time passes by? In many cases, the results have been interpreted as
contradictory (e.g., see Balles & Schaic, 1976; Horn & Donaldson, 1976). There are,
however, some issues on which there seems to be a high level of agreement. For example,
some crystallized intelligence abilities of healthy individuals can be expected to improve
throughout life by increased or higher levels of education. On the other hand, fluid
intelligence abilities are influenced by the physiological status of the individual; thus, any
physiological degeneration will usually result in a decrement in fluid intellectual abilities.
Horn and Donaldson have cautioned that decrements in intelligence, whether crystallized or
fluid, are not inevitable in every person and arc not an inherent aspect of the aging process.
The psychological literature on intelligence and aging over the past few decades
has been dominated by a stereotypic view of decline (Baltcs & Schaie, 1976).
Representative of this view, Botwinick (1977) noted that the decline in intellectual ability
is clearly a part of advancing age. However, in one of his subsequent reports Botwinick
(1978) suggested that the recent literature which focuses more on longitudinal research
points to small declines in intelligence with age, and in some instances, no decline
whatsoever. Similar results were reported by Horn and Donaldson (1976). After
presenting a thorough review of the logical and empirical evidence, they suggested that

some intelligence abilities (e.g., verbal comprehension, numerical skills) improve
throughout most parts of adulthood, or at least do not decline as much or as early as other
abilities. They concluded that perhaps some adults manage or learn to avoid decrements
which affect others. Baltes and Schaie (1974) found that on many measures of
vocabulary and skills reflecting educational experience, individuals seem to maintain their
levels of functioning into their sixth and seventh decade without any noticeable losses.
Whether or not aging per se alters intelligence is not an easy question to answer
because of the many components of intellectual functioning and their differential
relationships among one another. For example, the IOM (1981) report mentioned that an
early decline in intelligence in active airline pilots (i.e., prior to 60 years of age) is very
unlikely. Pilots as a group appear to have above average intelligence and there appears to
be no correlation between age and intelligence. Another report (Labouvie-Vief, 1985)
conducted an exhaustive literature review and found that most research on the cognitive
capacities of aging adults is still performed using models that address themselves to youth
rather than adulthood (e.g., testing techniques and measurement instruments). Other
research (Schaie, 1974) supports the previous comment by suggesting that a presumed
decline in intelligence with old adults is, at best, a methodological artifact. There appear
to be large interindividual, cultural, and generational differences that are likely to
influence test results. Labouvie-Vief concluded that cognitive abilities of older adults are
inevitably interpreted with a regression-oriented bias. Some research (e.g., Horn &
Donaldson, 1976) has suggested that our state of knowledge about intelligence and aging
is not sufficient to permit authoritative assertions that there is, or that there is not, any
intelligence decrement associated with aging.
Other types of cognitive processing that are occupationally relevant to a pilot's job
were also reported (Glanzer & Glaser, 1959; Mertens & Collins, 1985; Salthouse,
Babcock, Skovronek, Mitchell, & Palmon, 1990). Salthouse et al. conducted three
separate studies in order to investigate the effects of age and experience on spatial
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visualization abilities among members of an occupation in which these abilities are in
constant use (i.e., architects). Spatial visualization refers to the mental manipulation of
spatial information (e.g., where another aircraft is or will be relative to your physical
position and heading). The samples consisted of 107 men ranging in age from 21 to 78
years. They found that increased age was associated with significantly lower levels of
performance, even for those subjects with extensive spatial visualization experience.
They concluded that their findings suggest that age-related changes on certain aspects of
cognitive functioning may be independent of the amount of occupational experience.
One of the very few studies that conducted research on pilots was done by #
Glanzer and Glaser (1959). They tested 544 subjects which were Air National Guard
aircrewmen and/or commercial airline pilots between 20 and 50 years of age (mean age of
31.8 years). The test battery consisted of 14 psychometric tests measuring job tasks
critical to pilot performance (e.g., learning and remembering, interpreting spatial patterns,
mathematical reasoning, numerical calculations and approximations). In eight of the 14
tests, statistically significant age-related declines were observed on the basis of their
cross-sectional data, even after flight experience was compensated for. However, the
mathematical skills, which are very important to a pilot's job, did not show decrements
with increased age. Other research (Mertens & Collins, 1985) examined various
aviation-related tasks. They tested 30 healthy non-pilot subjects to determine the effects
of stressors (e.g., sleep deprivation, altitude) on complex performance. A multiple-task
battery was used to measure the performance of severalflight-relatedtasks under varying
workload conditions. The tasks included monitoring warning lights and meters, mental
arithmetic, problem solving, target identification, and tracking. They found that the
performance of older subjects (60-69 years old) was consistently lower than the younger
subjects (30-39 years old) in all tasks.
Although there arc many studies on aging in humans, Braune and Wickens (1984)
suggested that since most of this research has not been conducted on pilots, the extent to
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which these studies can be generalized to pilots may indeed be limited. The IOM (1981)
report suggested that aging effects established for general population subjects may not
apply to pilots, especially airline pilots who constantly exercise well-practiced skills.
Gault (1991) found that from a pilot's point of view, the effects of aging are of more
interest as compared to most other groups because of the occupation's exacting demands
on individual abilities and capacities. Another finding (e.g., Rcinharl, 1982) indicated that
most professional pilots are well informed about age-related changes and have a number
of resources available to them so that they can educate themselves in health maintenance.
In addition, some studies (e.g., Booze & Simcox, 1984; IOM; The Medical Study jproup,
1988) found that pilots have demonstrated to be more physically fit than the general
population at comparable ages, in addition to being better educated. Nevertheless, some
physical components, perceptual capabilities, and sensory functions will deteriorate to a
certain extent with increased age.
The psychological literature reviewed suggests that age-related changes do occur in
all individuals with advancing age, and some abilities relevant to pilot performance will
inevitably deteriorate. However, it would be misleading to state that these age-related
changes occur by age 60, especially in healthy professional pilots. In fact, many studies
have indicated that great variations in individual capabilities and tolerances exist from person
to person (Braune & Wickens, 1984; Gerathewohl, 1978b; IOM; Mohler, 1981; Shriver,
1953; Szafran, 1969; The Medical Study Group; Tsang, 1989; Wentz, 1964). For example,
a nonroutine event (e.g., loss of electrical power, in-flight fire) might be totally disabling to
one person, but taken in stride by another. In summary, the psychological literature
suggests that the status of the generally anticipated deficits in abilities associated with aging
is left open to discussion, particularly with respect to healthy professional pilots.
Regulatory

Background

The current procedures for regulatory control of this problem vary in the U.S.,
depending upon the type of flight operations. General aviation pilots can fly as long as

they can maintain a current medical certificate appropriate for their type of flying duties.
The same is true for commuter pilots, charter pilots, corporate pilots, and even the FAA's
own pilots. However, regulatory control for airline pilots is more rigidly defined. At 60
years of age airline pilots may no longer serve as PIC. Braune and Wickens (1983)
suggested that it is assumed that chronologically younger individuals are more likely to
perform better in such a demanding environment; thus, chronological age limits are
imposed. This age regulation is the result of a combination of several difficult-to-define
variables which are believed to lead to the anticipated deterioration of the skills necessary
to fly an airliner at the safety level we have come to demand (Lavin, 1989).
This anticipated deterioration of essential capabilities has been used to justify the
age limitation for U.S. airline pilots. Three decades ago, the FAA mandated an upper age
limit on all pilots of commercial airliners weighing more than 7500 lb and carrying more
than 30 passenger seats. This regulation was issued on December 1,1959, and
implemented on March 15,1960. It is commonly known as the Age 60 Rule and is
administered by the U.S. government under Part 121.383(c) (Appendix A) of the Federal
Aviation Regulations which prohibits individuals from serving as pilot or copilot of these
commercial airliners upon reaching their 60th birthday (GAO, 1989).
Part of the rationale asserted by the FAA to support this regulation was that the risk
of heart attack, stroke, or sudden incapacitation sharply increased after age 60 and that no
accurate scientific means of assessing risk on an individual basis then existed. The reports
and research studies in which the FAA finalized their conclusions are dated from 1938 to
1958. The studies were based on characteristics of the entire American adult male
population, rather than on the healthier and better monitored pilot population (Select
Committee on Aging, 1979). According to the GAO (1989), the FAA adopted the Age 60
Rule because of the large increase in the number of older pilots and the potential effects that
this might have on public safety in commercial air transportation. Although not a problem
at the time, the FAA concluded that accidents among older pilots could become one.
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The Age 60 Rule is not considered as a mandatory retirement policy by the FAA
because it does not prohibit pilotsfromserving in other capacities. Upon reaching their
60th birthday, pilots can contribute their knowledge and expertise by becoming flight
instructors, check airmen, or flight engineers (Select Committee on Aging, 1985). Also,
since this rule does not apply to the commuters (i.e., Part 135 scheduled operators), pilots
60 and over can fly smaller aircraft that weigh less than 7,500 lb and have fewer than 30
passenger seats (GAO, 1989). Why does this rule not apply to these pilots as well? No
detailed explanation has ever been given for the underlying logic that allows other pilots to
fly beyond age 60. One airline pilot (S. G. Broderick, personal communication, June 1,
1990) contested that commuter pilots often fly "harder time" in less equipped aircraft, and
often up to eight or nine legs per day. The National Institute on Aging (1981)
recommended that the Age 60 Rule should be extended to all pilots, specifically commuter
pilots. By its very nature, this rule has been extremely controversial. It has frequently
been scrutinized in legal challenges, public hearings, and legislative actions.
Other reports (e.g., Mohler, 1981; Mohler, 1986) found that our neighboring
countries, Canada and Mexico, have no Federal upper age limit for commercial pilots.
Mohler (1981) went on to note that in Great Britain, the upper age limitation of 60 years of
age only applies to the captain. Additionally, Reinhart (1991) reported that British
Airways requires their pilots to retire at 55; but just recently, the airline gave pilots the
option to fly beyond 55 if they took additional tests. In light of this issue, several letters
were written to foreign nations requesting the exact nature of their regulatory control for
pilots. Many countries responded and a synopsis of the relevant statements is presented in
Table 1. The actual letters are reproduced in Appendix B.
There have been other proposed alternatives and procedures to this highly debated
issue. One possible technical solution suggests involving more comprehensive medical and
performance tests than are currently required (Boone, 1982; National Institute on Aging,
1981; Office of Technology Assessment, 1990; Select Committee on Aging, 1979).
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Table 1. Synopsis of Pilot Age Limits from Foreign Letter Responses
Country

Summary

Australia

Non-commercial operations — no upper age limit, provided that
pilots satisfy the medical standards appropriate to the level of
license held.
Commercial and higher category license — no upper age limit,
but restrictions placed upon pilots who have reached age 60.
Those restrictions are: the aircraft must be equipped with dual
controls and the operating crew includes another pilot who has
not reached 60 years of age, and (a) if the pilot is <65 years of
age, he/she must pass aflighttest within the preceding 12
months, and (b) if the pilot is ^65 years of age, he/she must
pass a flight test within the previous 6 months.
•

Finland

Private Pilot License — no upper age limit.
Commercial and Air Traffic Pilot license — upper age limit
of 60.

Germany (G.D.R.)

All pilots — no upper age limit; only criteria for terminating an
aviator's career are the medical regulations.

Mexico

General Aviation Pilots — no upper age limit.
Airline Pilots — agreement between airlines and pilots' union
to retire at 60.

New Zealand

All Pilots — no upper age limit. An aviator's career is
terminated if he/she develops a medical condition for which a
waiver cannot be issued.

Norway

Private Pilot License — no upper age limit provided that the
pilot satisfy the minimum flying hours per year and have valid
medical papers, or have passed a biannual Periodic Flight
Training (PFT) session.
Commercial Pilot License — upper age limit of 60 for
international flights.

United Kingdom

Private Pilot License — no upper age limit, but an increase in
frequency of medical examinations with age (see Appendix B
for details).
Professional Pilot License — upper age limit of 60 with respect
to Public Transport; however, pilots may continue as Public
Transport pilots until age 65, provided they are a member of a
two-pilot crew aircraft with a maximum total weight authorized
not to exceed 20,000 kg (43,860 lb).
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Recently, political solutions have been proposed. U.S. Representative James Lightfoot
introduced a bill (H.R. 3498) to the House of Representatives to increase the current age
limit from 60 to 65, and Iowa Senator Charles Grassley introduced an identical bill (S.
2077) to the U.S. Senate (Cox, 1990). Both bills are currently on hold. See Appendix C
for a copy of H.R. 3498.
Background of the Age 60 Rule

Controversy

After the Age 60 Rule went into effect, the reaction from the airline industry was
divided. Some aviation organizations supported the rule, while others called it
discriminatory and strongly opposed it (GAO, 1989). Over the years, a number of pilots
have legally challenged the FAA's policy of denying all requests for exemption from the
Age 60 Rule. Recently, as noted in FAA Reopens (1989), the Federal Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit vacated exemption denials of 39 airline pilot petitioners. The
court concluded: " . . . the FAA failed to set forth a sufficient factual or legal basis for
the rejection of the petitioner's claim that older pilot's edge in experience offsets any
detected physical losses" (p. 2). On October 31,1990 the Appeals Court affirmed the
FAA's denial of exemptions in a 2-1 decision. According to an aviation attorney (A. M.
Serwer, personal communication, November 27,1990), this permits the FAA to deny all
exemption petitions to the Age 60 Rule.
In order to establish a basis for revocation of the Age 60 Rule, the FAA held
two public hearings, one in 1970 and the other in 1977. The Aerospace Medical
Association and the Committee on Aerospace Medicine of the American Medical
Association both supported the rule. Furthermore, the revocation request was denied
at both hearings (GAO, 1989). It is believed that these organizations supported the rule
because no other acceptable allernativc(s) that would offer equivalent protection to the
American travelling public could be determined; and since our aviation system has
operated effectively and safely within its bounds for the past 20 years, there seemed
to be no need to change it.

Some who once favored the Age 60 Rule are now starting to express some
concern. Former president of the Aerospace Medical Association, Dr. George Kidera,
who was on the panel that originally wrote the rule was more recently quoted in Dodson
(1990): "We knew it was arbitrary, but we just couldn't accurately predict which pilots
were likely to fall ill and which weren't. Now we can, so there's no reason not to let a
qualified pilot fly beyond age 60" (p. 194).
Pilots and other aviation enthusiasts have also challenged the Age 60 Rule by
legislative means as well. In 1979, the House Select Committee on Aging, the House
Subcommittee on Aviation, and the Committee on Public Works and Transportationjield
hearings to determine the status of the rule. The GAO (1989) found that the result of those
hearings was Public Law 96-171 (see Appendix D). Briefly, this law called upon the
National Institutes of Health to conduct a study to determine whether or not mandatory
retirement for certain pilots at age 60 or any other age was justified. The National Institute
on Aging (1981) was assigned to the project, and their report concluded " . . . that there is
no convincing medical evidence to support age 60, or any other specific age, for mandatory
pilot retirement" (p. 2). However, the study also suggested that if the current age limit
were increased, the probability of accidents would also increase. Unfortunately, the study
did not make any projections regarding the magnitude of this increase in accidents, nor how
the increase would compare to other younger groups of pilots.
Exemption requests and challenges to the Age 60 Rule continue to occur. After
reviewing several studies focused on gerontology, degenerative diseases, physiological
and psychological changes, and the pilot population in comparison with the general
population, the FAA concluded that there arc no alternatives that would ensure the same
level of safety as that of the Age 60 Rule. According to the GAO (1989), the FAA argues
that regardless of advances made in medical diagnosis and treatment, and in primary
prevention techniques, the incidences of death and disability from degenerative diseases
increase with age (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Death and Disability Rates in Air Carrier Pilots and Flight Engineers
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by National Institute on Aging, 1981, p. 3.
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The legal and political challenges of pilots1 wanting to fly as PIC beyond age 60
and the defensive position of the FAA have polarized the issue. Both sides may be
expected to selectively seek and report data supportive of their positions on the issue.
Consequently, the need for an objective evaluation of the age-related issues and regulatory
solutions is paramount, especially with the anticipated shortage of qualified pilots that has
been forecasted, along with the projected growth of the U.S. commercial airline industry.
Corroborating Reports of Age-Related

Accidents

There have been recent efforts to support the Age 60 Rule with age-related
accident statistics. These supporting statistics come from a seven-year-old study wjjich
covered accidents in general aviation from 1976 to 1980 (Golaszewski, 1983). General
aviation entails the operations of U.S. civil aircraft owned and operated by persons,
corporations, etc., other than those engaged in U.S. air carrier operations, like scheduled
airliners or commercial operators of large aircraft (IOM, 1981). Koonce (1989) pointed
out that this study suffers from a number of wSerious deficiencies. The study claims that
as pilots age, there is an increase in the accident rate. The accident rate is commonly
calculated as the number of accidents divided by 100,000 hours of recent flight time (i.e.,
annual flight time). The data used in Golaszcwski's study represented all pilots (Class I,
II, and HI medical certificates) flying all types of aircraft, such as homebuilts, aircraft
without copilots, and single-engine aircraft which may be less safe than commercial
transport aircraft supported by large maintenance organizations. Golaszewskifs study
has been under much scrutiny; however, he did indicate that his research was never
intended to support the Age 60 Rule. It was a preliminary research project to learn
something about how experience and age relate to accidents (Stephens, 1989).
There have been other studies in the past that have looked at aviation accident
statistics as a function of pilot age. Harper (1964) found that increasing age contributes
significantly to accidents as well as to fatality rates. Harper also suggested that increasing
age is closely associated with an increased risk of accidents. A similar report (Booze,

1977) noted that several previous studies have indicated that age is repeatedly associated
with an increased risk of general aviation accidents. Supporting this, Lategola, Fiorica,
Booze, and Folk (1970) analyzed civil aviation accidents and found that with the exception
of the 40-49 age group, the accident record (accidents per 10,000 airmen) increased with
age. It should be noted that the accident record tells us nothing of the pilot's risk or
exposure factor (e.g., how many hours flown or the number of takeoffs and landings per
pilot). According to the National Institute on Aging (1981) report, exposure is perhaps
the most important factor in aviation accident statistics. One other study (Office of
Technology Assessment, 1990) found that pilots between 60-69 years of age who fceld
first and second class medical certificates, had an accident rate twice as high as similar
pilots in their 50s, but a lower rate than pilots between 20 and 39 years of age.
On the other hand, Fotos (1988) reported that pilots in two age groups, between
50-59, and over 60, experienced accident rates below the average. Likewise, Mohler et
al. (1967) analyzed the accident records of older general aviation pilots, over 60, and
concluded that the older group had an accident record essentially comparable, and in some
cases superior to that of the younger pilot group. Another study (Mohler, 1983), found a
decrease in the number of accidents with increasing age for pilots flying in general aviation
who have earned commercial and air transport pilot (ATP) certificates. Mohler noted that
higher age groups are consistently associated with lower accident records because the
older pilots' performance reflects the effects of increasing experience and judgment.
Supporting that statement, Charles Caudle, a witness in Select Committee on Aging
(1979) stated, "Judgment, born of knowledge and tempered with experience, is the
foundation of air safety" (p. 16).
One of the more recent reports on pilot accident rates (Serwer, 1990) recalculated
the data from the Flight Time Study (Golaszewski, 1983). Serwer found that by using the
two highest experience categories in the study (>5,001 hours total flight time and >400
hours recent flight time) the accident rate per 100,000 recent flight hours decreased with

age, from 9.0 for the 20-29 year age group to 3.1 for the 60-69 year olds. These results
are similar to the Office of Technology Assessment (1990) findings (i.e., pilots between
60-69 years of age had a lower accident rate than those pilots between 20-39 years of age).
From these results, one can reasonably say that each time an older pilot (i.e., 60-69 years
old) is replaced by a younger pilot (i.e., between 20-39 years old) the safety level would
decrease. Then why do we not let airline pilots fly until 65 or even 69 years of age? One
could argue that the Age 60 Rule conflicts with the FAA's mandate to provide the highest
standard of airline passenger safety, because safer pilots (60-69 years old) are being
replaced by less safe pilots (30-39 years old).
A letter from the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) to the FAA (1988) indicated
that older pilots may have a lower accident rate than younger pilots. However, this may
be due to their greater seniority rather than their greater experience, which gives the older
pilots more freedom to choose their assignments. In making that choice, older pilots tend
to bid on more desirable and possibly less strenuous or less demanding assignments, and
often these trips provide the greatest number of flight hours. These trips can be argued to
be inherently less risky because there are fewer takeoffs and landings; and it is in these
two critical stages of flight that two-thirds of aviation accidents occur. In contrast, others
argue that while the older pilots fly the longer trips, they land their aircraft after 10-12
hours of flight, when fatigue is likely to produce some undesirable effects.
It has been shown that many studies have calculated accident rales and safety
levels with general aviation data, but to this researcher's knowledge not one has focused
specifically on airline operations. Why? The problem lies in acquiring the appropriate
data. According to the FAA's Forecast Branch (G. Mercer, personal communication, July
26, 1990), most of the necessary data (e.g., airline pilot flight hour distribution and the
number of takeoffs and landings as a function of pilot age) have not been captured
anywhere. Additionally, Foushee and Helmrcich (1988) stated,"... since accidents are
so infrequent, they make terrible research criteria forjudging crew performance" (p. 218).

A similar observation was made in Baker et al. v. FAA (1989). It was suggested that
because of the extremely small number of accidents in commercial airline operations, there
is simply no purpose for, nor are there data available for a broad scale statistical study of
airline accidents and age.
It is obvious that the literature gives a number of mixed results. Some studies
support the hypothesis of a decrease in safely with advancing age, while others report
opposite findings. Koonce (1989) revealed that by utilizing different methodologies, one
can get very different results. Koonce showed that differing viewpoints can be obtained
from the same data, it all depends upon the goal of the researcher(s).
Experience
It has been suggested (Salthouse, 1987) that experience is a very important variable
moderating human performance and one that should be considered when attempting to
examine any type of individual differences in behavior. Salthouse noted lhat research in
the past has convincingly demonstrated that adults of all ages benefit from experience. In a
recent court case (Baker et al. v. FAA, 1989) it was postulated that in aviation, pilot
experience enhances safety. One study on aviators (Shriver, 1953) noted lhat experience
is undoubtedly a major factor leading to greater effectiveness in emergencies. Similar
remarks were reported in Baker et al. v. FAA which cited airline industry experts
indicating that even the best training is not always an adequate substitute for years of
experience in the most demanding cockpit situations, especially those requiring knowledge
and proficiency to handle an emergency. Furthermore, Dodson (1990) quoted former
FAA administrator Donald D. Engen stating: "Training is important, but when everything
turns to worms, experience is what counts" (p. 190).
Many things can improve with age when they are practiced often enough,
particularly judgment. According to Edwards (1990), the prevalent opinion is that
judgment only comes from experience. One can be taught procedures, motor skills,
principles, and perhaps emotional control, but judgment comes only from performing

tasks, experiencing the results and modifying the performance in future similar situations.
One report, (Mohler, 1981) referring specifically to airline pilots, noted that experience
enhances judgment, and that older healthy persons tend to be less impulsive, and
consequently have better safety records. Does this suggest that age-related changes
disappear with older individuals who have had extensive experience with such relevant
activities? In light of this question, Morrow et al. (1990) noted that since older pilots
usually have more flight experience, any age-related declines in motor and cognitive
functions would most likely be offset by their invaluable flight experience.
It is generally felt throughout the industry that experience, whether general pr
specific, yields a variety of benefits. Many skills, particularly those required in today's
complex airliners, are practiced over the years for hundreds and even thousands of hours,
and such experience may lead to improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of
performance. Sterns et al. (1985) studied various kinds of accidents (e.g., mining,
transportation, construction, manufacturing) and how they relate to aging individuals.
They stated, "Older adults may maintain many highly practiced activities at a constant level
even though they are subjected to age-related declines; in short, experience compensates
for their loss in ability" (p. 720). Other similar remarks were made by Salthouse (1990b),
who concluded that somehow increased levels of experience lead to a compensation for
declining abilities. Although these reports suggest that increased experience reduces the
magnitude of age-related changes, Salthouse (1990a) observed that the empirical basis for
this position has not been explicitly confirmed.
Despite its importance, the effects of experience arc subject to limitations.
Salthouse (1987) asserted that there is an upper threshold level of experience relevant to
performance. Once that threshold is exceeded, further increments in experience do not
necessarily contribute to increases in performance. For example, a letter from the staff
counsel for ALPA was cited by the FAA in Baker et al v. FAA (1989): ALPA theorized
that once a pilot acquires 5,000 hours of flight time, the law of diminishing returns comes

into play; i.e., any additional flight time does not necessarily improve that pilots
performance from a safety standpoint. Although this implication derived by ALPA was
based on Golaszewski's (1983) Flight Time Study, it was not supported by any data.
Relating flying time to experience also presents some philosophical problems; e.g.,
does a pilot have 10,000 hours of experience, or 10 hours of experience 1,000 times?
Shriver (1953) studied the effects of aging and experience on aircrew performance. After
interviewing 556 military aircrewmen (with a mean age of 29.5 and a mean number of
1,800 flying hours), Shriver noted that at some point in an aviator's career, a peak appears
to be reached, after which performance begins to deteriorate. From this, Shriver
hypothesized that this deterioration in performance may be due to both physical and
motivational changes outweighing the positive effects of experience. In addition, Reinhart
(1991) reported that we like to think that we are just as good as we once were in the good
old days of our youth; in many ways, with our years of experience, we are, but not as
good in others.
It has also been suggested (Edwards, 1990) that experience does not always leach
correctly. For example, as pilots become more experienced, they do not necessarily
become better at making decisions in all situations. They are able to make routine decisions
more effectively because of the countless number of limes such similar situations have
arisen. Edwards added that sometimes decisions are made that work out well, but they
were made for the wrong reasons (i.e., not all errors result in accidents). Consequently,
the most experienced pilots may sometimes be led to make less effcclivc decisions in
infrequently occurring situations than equally well-informed novices. But, this lends to be
the exception, and it is generally accepted and supported by the available data that
experience contributes to better performance in most tasks and is overall beneficial.
Salthouse (1990a) noted that most of the studies designed to examine interrelations
of age and experience seem to have implicitly utilized either a maintenance (i.e.,
experience preserves abilities lhat would otherwise decline) or a remediation (i.e., added

experience reverses ability declines) interpretation of the role of experience. Salthouse
reported that because the currently available evidence is ambiguous, there is a substantial
opportunity for one's biases and prejudices to influence the nature of the conclusion
regarding the possibility that experience minimizes age-related changes. Furthermore, the
existing literature is still too uncertain to support firm convictions about whether age
differences on familiar activities are smaller than those on new or unfamiliar activities,
whether age differences can be lessened or eliminated with extensive experience, or
whether performance differences at different ages are absent on continuously practiced
activities associated with one's occupation.
Other Relevant Issues
The present aviation system is not flawless by any means. Pilot error remains the
single greatest contributing cause of aircraft accidcnls. In the interest of safety, we must
always look for ways to improve or supplement our current aviation system. The Age 60
Rule is intended to be part of the margin of safely that is built into the system to reduce the
probability of accidents. Dodson (1990) quoted a National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) official who said, "Young pilots used to learn the ropes as flight engineers.
Now, with two-man cockpits, we're putting them directly into the co-pilot's seat, and that
might erode a margin of safety" (p. 190). In addition to eliminating the experience gained
as a flight engineer prior to moving into the co-pilot's seat, the anticipated pilot shortage in
combination with the Age 60 Rule may be moving co-pilots into the captain's seat at an
earlier point in their careers. This double loss of experience may cause the Age 60 Rule to
be counterproductive. Thus, do we increase the likelihood of accidcnls by retiring some
of our most seasoned and experienced pilots and replacing them with younger less
experienced pilots?
The FAA has major concerns about the probability of sudden incapacitation and
the relative inability of physicals and check rides to detect deterioration in pilot skills. The
IOM (1981) report described sudden incapacitation as an immediate loss of consciousness
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without prior symptoms and results in the pilot's inability to control the aircraft, whether
due to physiological or psychological reasons. The IOM also noted in their report that
sudden incapacitation is a serious, but rare event among pilots.
Other literature (Bennett, 1972; Booze, 1987; Buley, 1969; Froom, Benbassat,
Gross, Ribak, & Lewis, 1988; Mohler & Booze, 1978; Office of Technology
Assessment, 1990; Rayman, 1973; Reighard & Mohler, 1967) has also cited pilot
incapacitations as infrequent events. Mohler and Booze found that general aviation
accidents due to sudden incapacitation are less than 1% of all documented fatal general
aviation accidents. Buley studied airline pilot inflight incapacitations and found that#in
cases resulting in accidents, the average pilot age was 46 years old, and in cases not
resulting in accidents, the average pilot age was 44 years old. In addition, Bennett found
that a vast majority of inflight incapacitations are not age-related. Bennett reported that a
large number of these incidents are related to food poisoning. The incapacitations by
decreasing order of frequency are: nausea and vomiting associated with gastrointestinal
upset, diarrhea, ear problems, faintness, headaches, and vertigo. However, despite the
rarity of these events, there is still the possibility of such a classic case. Reighard and
Mohler cited the catastrophic Lockheed Electra accident from 1966 as an example in which
the captain, who was 59 years old, became incapacitated silently during a circling
approach in instrument conditions and 83 occupants lost their lives.
Many pilots believe that special medical waivers arc the only answer to this complex
issue. The FAA may grant waivers if it is shown lhat a balanced level of safety will be
provided when the waiver is granted (Glines, 1985). According to the GAO (1989) report,
challengers of the rule allege that the FAA has been inconsistent in granting exemptions
from certain medical requirements, but not from the Age 60 Rule (see Table 2). Bruce and
Fisher (1987) argued since the FAA grants special issuances to those pilots under 60 years
of age who are medically qualified despite prior myocardial infarction or bypass surgery,
they should also be able to grant special issuances for pilots over 60 who are healthy and at
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Table 2. Special Issuances Granted to Applicants for Class I Medical Certificates
Number of!special issuances granted
Medical condition

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Valve replacements
Pacemaker
Coronary artery bypass
surgery/coronary
artery disease
Angioplasty
Myocardial infarction
(w/no bypass surgery)
Neurological3
Psychiatric0
Drug dependence
Alcoholism
Diabetes
Total

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

0
0

0
0

0
0

2
0

3
1

5
0

2
0

9
0

2
2

3
3

36
7

26
10

15
9

20
16

1
2
1
0
37
0

2
2
1
1
73
0

3
6
0
0
81
0

17
6
3
3
90
1

14
10
2
3
87
0

20
6
3
0
88
0

14
2

•o

50

83

96

165

156

146

143

8
79
2

1 aNeurological includes carotid artery conditions, stroke, disturbance of consciousness,
1 and convulsive reactions.
1 DPsychiatric includes schizoph renia, paranoid states, psychoses , and personality
1 disorders.
Source: FAA, Civil Aeromedical Institute, Oklahoma City.

Note. From "Aviation Safely: Information of FAA's Age 60 Rule for Pilots" by General
Accounting Office (GAO), 1989, p. 16.

low risk for coronary events. It should also be recognized that these waivers are limited
and only affect a small minority of pilots. On the other hand, the Age 60 Rule affects all
pilots, and if one waiver is given, others will begin applying for the exemption. Some
pilots feel that there would be too much surveillance of the pilots over 60 by both the FAA
and by individual airlines, and this would burden the whole system (Hammond, 1989).
However, one aviation attorney (A. M. Serwer, personal communication, January 17,
1991) speculated that a large proportion of airline pilots would like to retire at age 60. In
light of this question, Reinhart (1991) conducted a survey on what individual pilots think
of the Age 60 Rule. Reinhart found that 74% of the 250 responses indicated that thgy
would accept additional and more extensive evaluations in order to fly beyond age 60.
However, from the total survey results he concluded that there is not a convincing majority
of pilots who want to continuing flying beyond age 60.
Some research (Downey & Dark, 1990; Mohler, 1984) found that during recent
years, advances in aviation medicine and changes in FAA policies and procedures have
resulted in the medical certification of pilots who, in earlier years, would have been
denied. Many pilots claim that they do not understand the logic of the FAA's policy
toward waivers. The FAA's application of medical knowledge to recertify these pilots
with serious medical disorders demonstrates that the agency has the power and is willing
to individualize its medical considerations and base judgments on the latest developments
in medicine and pilot proficiency assessments. However, an FAA official indicated that
medical exemptions are granted for single, specific problems, and that the Age 60 Rule is
not a single-problem issue ("Federal Rule," 1989).
The Office of Technology Assessment (1990) indicated that the incidence of
medical illnesses that may impair pilot performance increases with age. Supporting this,
comprehensive data of airline pilots who were denied medical certification was analyzed
by Downey and Dark (1990). They found that age-specific denial rates increase with age.
The annual denial rate for first class medical certificates was found to be 4.3 per 1,000

active airline pilots, increasing from 1.0 per 1,000 in the 25-29 age group to 16.2 per
1,000 in the 55-59 age group (see Table 3). This demonstrates that the physical exams are
detecting deterioration with age and eliminating those pilots who fall below the standard

Table 3. First Class Medical Denials (Airline Pilots)

Age
Groups

Active
Airline
Pilots

25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
TOTAL

5,698
8,809
10,005
9,544
10,288
7,760
3,576
55,680

Percent
of
Active
Airline
Pilots
10.2
15.8
18
17.2
18.5
13.9
6.4
100

Denied
Airline
Pilots
7
16
20
52
115
150
116
476

Percent of
Total
Denials

Annual
AgeSpecific
Denial
Rate*

1.5
3.4
4.2
10.9
24.1
31.5
24.4
100

1
1
1
2.7
5.6
9.7
16.2
4.3

.

•Annual rates per 1,000 active airline pilots.
Note. Adapted from "Medically Disqualified Airline Pilots in Calender Years 1987 and 1988"
by L. E. Downey and S. J. Dark, 1990, DOT/FAA/AM-90/5, p. 3.

established for safety. However, one must interpret this data with caution because
there may be other factors contributing to this sharp increase in medical denials with age
(e.g., economic status of the airline, management/union disagreements); this also suggests
that there may be other reasons for a pilot to retire early prior to age 60 (e.g., income
tax advantage).
The retirements mandated by the Age 60 Rule may have possibly contributed to the
loss of our most experienced pilots, and could be forcing the airlines to lower their
standards and hire less qualified pilots. Moorman (1986) found that the amount of jetflying time required by airlines for new hirees has dropped from 2,300 hours in 1983, to

1,600 in 1984, and to 800 in 1985. New hirees are not of course, employed immediately
as PIC. They often spend years in the flight engineers1 seats flying sideways before they
even get a chance to touch the controls. According to an airline captain (E. Soliday,
personal communication, September 25, 1990), it takes a new hiree roughly 11 years for
promotion to the left seat (i.e., at the time of this conversation). But that number varies
from year to year and from airline to airline due to hiring trends. One must keep in mind,
however, that the nature of this progression is changing. For example, new automated
commercial airliners (e.g., MD-11, B-747-400) only require two pilots, rather than three.
This means that new hirees of tomorrow will be hired as first officers (i.e., copilots#with
hands on theflightcontrols) rather than as flight engineers silting sideways in the back.
It should be apparent that the Age 60 Rule is a very complex issue with many
confounding details. The arguments presented by both sides (i.e., supporters and
petitioners) are undoubtedly legitimate concerns. Many issues concerning the effects of
age and experience on flight safety were identified in this study, and the major points are
as follows:
1. Physiological and psychological changes do occur in all individuals with
advancing age, and these changes are likely to influence the performance of
complex tasks and critical skills.
2. Many of the studies reviewed on human performance and aging suggest
progressive declines with increasing age; however, it can be argued that most of
these age-related changes are attributed to one's lifestyle rather than age itself.
3. The recertification of many special issuances suggests that the FAA has the
knowledge and is willing to individualize the current medical standards. If recent
advances in aviation medicine can accurately predict which pilots are likely to
become ill and which are not, then healthy professional pilots should be allowed to
fly beyond age 60. Although, even if the FAA and the airlines allow pilots to fly
beyond 60, it cannot be said for certain that safety will be enhanced.

4. Professional pilots are likely to be more aware of and may be more cautious to
these age-related changes because these changes could easily affect their livelihood.
Reinhart (1982) noted that most professional pilots are well informed and have a
number of resources available to them so that they can educate themselves in health
maintenance.
5. Years of experience in the cockpit may compensate for or reduce the magnitude
of age-related changes, especially when older pilots maintain their proficiency; thus
making them at least equal to if not better than their younger counterparts.
6. Since older pilots generally have more seniority, they tend to bid on more
desirable and possibly less strenuous or less demanding assignments. These trips
can be argued to be inherently less risky because there are fewer takeoffs and*
landings, thus reducing their risk factor.
7. The current practice of putting new hirees directly into the right seat is also an
area of concern because these new pilots are not getting the valuable experience as
they would if they wereflightengineers. The anticipated pilot shortage in
combination with the Age 60 Rule may be moving these new co-pilots into the
captain's seat at a much earlier point in their careers. This double loss of experience
may cause the Age 60 Rule to be counterproductive.
Statement of the Hypothesis
Many feel that in older pilots,flightexperience, knowledge, and judgment is
irreplaceable and that these unique qualities may offset potential health risks.
Consequently, the null hypothesis states that aging has no measurable effect on pilot
performance as inferred from the observed-over-expected number of accidents among
pilots; the alternative hypothesis argues that pilot performance deteriorates with age as
inferred from a greater number of observed-over-expected accidents among older pilots.

METHOD

Data Types and Sources
The data for this study came from records of general aviation accidents (i.e.,
private pilots, commercial pilots, and ATPs), and airline accidents (Part 121). An aircraft
accident, as defined by the NTSB, is an event involving substantial or greater damage to
the airplane and/or serious or greater injury to an occupant of that aircraft. The most
available data providing an accurate indication of our past and current aviation accident
trends are contained in a number of separately maintained data banks. These data were
acquired from the following specialized aviation data banks:
1. The NTSB's Accident Data Division compiled an accident data search with the
following broad categories: accidents from 1982-1988 for general aviation pilots,
commercial pilots, ATPs, and airline pilots. These categories contain the following data
elements: age of the PIC; commercial, ATP, and airline accidents in which "pilot error"
was the determined cause of the accident.
2. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) Air Safety Database
provided the number of general aviation accidents that occurred between 1982-1988
independent of cause and the number of accidents in which "pilot error" was the determined
cause of the accident. The Director of the AOPA Air Safety Database (J. Carson, personal
communication, December 5,1990) indicated that the AOPA has a special staff that
re-evaluates the NTSB accident reports and classifies them as pilot caused rather than pilot
error. The accidents were also separated by the type of license held (e.g., private pilot
only, commercial and/or ATP). It should be noted that the pilot error accidents were used
because they are a definite indicator of inadequate performance that could possibly be
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associated with the aging process. It has been recognized that performance failures appear
to be more closely related to pilot safety and proficiency than health or medical disabilities
in flight (Gerathewohl, 1978b).
3. The FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation provided the distribution of pilots
by age and by type of license held (i.e., private, commercial, and air transport). All data
were for the years 1982 to 1988.
4. The FAA's Aeromedical Certification Statistical Handbook provided the
distribution of airline pilots by age from 1982-1988. The Handbook stated that airline
pilots were determined by the combination of Class I medical certificate issuance dicing
the preceding 13 months and an occupation of "pilot for an airline" (see Table 4). Note
that Table 4 accounts for pilots age 60 and over who claim to be airline pilots.
However, the Age 60 Rule prohibits these pilots from operating as PIC (i.e., under Part
121 regulations); therefore, it was assumed that these pilots age 60 and over represent
those who fly commuter aircraft and/or those who choose to be flight engineers for the
airlines rather than retiring at age 60. Airline pilots are also referred to as Part 121
operators in this study.
5. The COMSIS Research Corporation provided theflighthour distribution for
Class I, II, and HI medical certificate holders in five-year age groups (e.g., 20-24,
25-29, 30-34) for 1982-1988 as compiled from FAA pilot medical records.
The data were stratified into categories according to the age of the PIC
responsible for the accident. The categories were grouped into five-year increments
starting at 20-24, and ending with 55-59. With reference to the airline data, the age
groups begin with 25-29 but end with 55-59, since they are the closest to the age limits
set by Part 61.151 and 121.383(c) for pilots holding an ATP rating and engaging in air
carrier operations (Downey & Dark, 1990). There is, however, no upper age limit set
for ATPs (i.e., an ATP can exercise his/her privileges as long as he/she can maintain the
appropriate medical certificate).

Table 4. Age Distribution of Airline Pilots* (As of December 31, of that year)

|

Age Group

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59

703
2,920
5,698
6,165
7,590
7,119
4,269
3,076

775
3,018
5,435
6,082
7,541
7,436
4,843
2,807

866
3,365
5,716
7,022
7,738
8,088
5,501
2,698

1,164
4,850
7,050
8,801
8,645
9,306
6,478
2,935

1,159
5,286
7,828
9,752
8,959
9,928
7,205
3,191

1,036
5,698
8,809
10,005
9,544
10,288
7,760
3,576

990
5,663
9,499
10,006
9,709
10,543
8,097
4,123

1,047
6,067
11,067
10,459
10,816
10,486
8,915
4,772

Subtotal
60-64
65-69

37,540
167
18

37,937
159
17

40,994
159
21

49,229
217
43

53,308
232
65

56,716
206
47

58,630
229
62

63,629
241
70

Total

37,725

38,113

41,174

49,489

53,605

56,969

58,921

63,940

Avg. Age

41.5

41.6

41.5

41.0

41.0

41.0

41.2

43.1

* Airline Pilots were determined by the combination of first class medical certificate issuance during the
preceding 13 months and an occupation of "pilot for an airline".

Note. From "Aeromedical Certification Statistical Handbook" by Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI), Aeromedical Certification
Division, Statistics and Records Branch.
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The data used for the analysis are the most current and reliable available.
Professionally trained investigators often spend months using state-of-the-art scientific
techniques to determine the primary cause of an accident, along with other essential
information. According to Westrum (1987), aircraft accident investigation has now
become a small branch of applied science or engineering, and these investigation
procedures are more thorough than those of other transportation modes.
Design
The design of this study consisted of collecting aviation accident data containing
pilot age and experience information from all available sources between 1982 and 1988.
In order to analyze the data accurately and efficiently, the data were organized into tables
and graphs. The accidents were analyzed in terms of: (a) the number of observed
accidents versus the number of expected accidents; (b) the accident record; (c) the accident
rate; and (d) the percentage of accidents classified as pilot error. The data were examined
to determine whether there were any trends across age groups and to verify any significant
differences between the different age groups.
The number of expected accidents was calculated by multiplying the proportion of
pilots in an age group by the total number of accidents observed for all age groups.
Accident records were calculated by dividing the number of accidents per age group by the
number of pilots in that age group (e.g., accidents per 1,000 active pilots). The accident
rates were calculated by dividing the number of accidents per age group by the number of
hours flown by pilots in that age group, and were evaluated by using a common metric
(e.g., accidents per 100,000 annual flight hours). The percentage of accidents classified
as pilot error were calculated by dividing the number of "pilot error" accidents per age
group by the total number of accidents in that age group. The observed-ovcr-expected
frequencies, accident records, accident rates, and percentage levels were studied for the
various age groups.
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This design is comparable to, but sought to avoid the bias that critics have
identified in Golaszewski's (1983) study. His study included non-general aviation
flight time, or air carrier hours in the accident rate equation (approximately 93 million
hours) which depressed the accident rate for pilots under age 60, but not so for pilots
age 60 and over. However, Golaszewski did recognize this as a potential discrepancy in
his study. The primary goal of this study was to keep the data as homogeneous as
possible; i.e., to keep Class III hours with private pilots, Class II hours with
commercial pilots, and Class I hours with ATPs and airline pilots.
The reader should be familiar with the different details involved in each class of
medical certificate. For example, Class HI operators are usually private and student pilots;
this class must have a physical examination every two years. Class II operators are
usually commercial pilots; this class must have a physical examination every year. Class I
operators are typically ATPs and/or airline pilots; this class must have a physical
examination every six months. However, it should be made clear that this does not
necessarily mean that all private pilots have only Class III medicals, nor does it mean that
all commercial pilots have only Class II medicals, and the same goes for ATPs and airline
pilots with respect to Class I medicals. These were just assumptions, and the limitations
of these assumptions are discussed in a subsequent part of this study.
Procedure
The relevant information from all of the available databases was assembled into a
common format which assisted the evaluation. Most of the data were obtained from 1982
to 1988 records. The data were categorized by age groups into a database on a personal
computer. The categories include: pilot age groups in five-year intervals starting at 2024, and up to 55-59; total number of active private pilots; total number of active
commercial pilots; total number of active ATPs; total number of active U.S. airline pilots;
number of accidents observed for a specified year by age group; number of accidents
expected for a specified year by age group; the accident record; and the accident rate.

The term active is a minimal definition used by the FAA and refers to more than zero
flight hours per year.
Limitations
There are some limitations in this study that need to be recognized. Some
assumptions were made that need to be identified. An assumption, according to Gay
(1987), is an important fad presumed to be true but not actually verified. The first
assumption pertains to the reported flight hour data (i.e., the COMSIS data), in which it
was assumed that all pilots accurately report their recent and total time when taking their
flight physical, and when reporting information in an accident investigation. According
to Golaszewski (1983), it is believed that most pilots do not take their logbooks with
them to flight physicals; therefore, they report their recent and total time from memory.
On the other hand, it is believed that the flight hours reported in accident investigations
may be more precise because of the formal nature of the investigative process. Without
the original pilot logbook, there is no practical means of testing the accuracy of the
reported flight time. Nevertheless, it is presumed that these inaccuracies are random
and will not significantly alter the results.
Another assumption was made in reference to the "pilot error" data. Some critics
may argue that pilot error was the determined cause because no other relevant cause was
found. This position has received some support in the literature; for example, Edwards
(1990) suggested that pilot error is often listed as the cause of the accident because there is
neither time nor money available for thorough investigations. These suggestions may be
true to some extent, but by and large, it is assumed that they represent only a small portion
of the total number of pilot error accidents.
The last assumption made in this study came about by utilizing the flight hour data
(i.e., hours flown by medical class holders). In regards to general aviation, it is true that
not every general aviation pilot holds a Class III certificate. In fact, some general aviation
pilots are Class I holders (e.g., airline captains) who often go flying for pleasure.

Furthermore, not all airline pilots are Class I holders (see Table 5). The captain is the
only one required to possess a Class I medical in an airline cockpit It is assumed that
most co-pilots (orfirstofficers) get the Class I medical, especially the new hirees because
it is normally required, but then let the medical downgrade to a Class II after six months,
so they do not have to make another trip to the Medical Examiner's office. This is not
only convenient, but also saves the pilot some money. Lastly, many of the hours
acquired by medical class holders (particularly Class I and Class II) are not actually
hands-on flight hours. These hours are logged by flight engineers who often "fly
sideways" in the back never touching the primary flight controls.
Cross-sectional

Constraints

Many studies discuss the limitations of cross-sectional studies (e.g., Hartley,
Harker & Walsh, 1980; Horn & Donaldson, 1976; Reese & Rodeheaver, 1985; Shock et
al., 1984; Willis & Baltes, 1980). Reese and Rodeheaver concluded that the apparent
cognitive regression in old age may be an artifact of the exclusive use of cross-sectional
methods. Differences in results (e.g., accident statistics) cannot be definitely interpreted
as deficits in competence or a decline in abilities. Willis and Baltes indicated that in a strict
sense, the cross-sectional method is never an appropriate substitute for longitudinal
investigation. The cross-sectional method is characterized by measurements made at
approximately the same time on a large number of subjects covering the entire adult age
span. Age changes are not measured directly but are inferred from the differences in mean
values observed in different age groups. Only average differences between age groups are
identified. The primary advantage of the cross-sectional method is that the presence of age
trends in a group of subjects can be detected fairly quickly. Caution is necessary in its
interpretation, however, since differences between age groups include both birth cohorts
as well as age effects.
Horn and Donaldson (1976) indicated that it is well known that in cross-sectional
analyses, differences between generations (e.g., level of formal education, training

Table 5. Number of Pilots by Type of License and Class of Medical Certificate (1982-1988)
20-24
169,345

25-29
254,111

30-34
315,427

35-39
322,102

40-44
284,601

45-49
228,723

50-54
201,167

55-59
181,523

60-64 a | 65-69 | Total |
2,151,078
194,079
-

No. of Third Class
Holders0

157,930

215,035

245,900

243,138

216,215

177,783

159,571

118,827

122,561

47,545

1,704,505

No. of Commercial
Pilots b

64,279

125,102

123,822

155,909

163,408

129,367

103,509

76,440

123,292

-

1,065,128

No. of Second Class
Holders0

53,956

73,015

82,490

102,094

95,195

74,374

62,079

40,178

49,478

19,950

652,809

No. of ATPs b

3,757

43,706

86,841

107,338

101,536

89,229

69.930

42,884

41,561

-

586,782

No. of Airline Pilots^

6,693

30,800

50,035

57,833

59,726

62,708

44,153

22,406

1,369

273

335,996

20,486

48,948

63,224

69,877

71,757

70,652

53,099

24,117

11,158

1,548

434,866

1 No. of Private Pilols b

No. of Firsl Class
1 Holders0

*The FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation lists the upper age group for all pilots as 60+.
^Source: FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation.
c
Source: COMSIS Research Corporation data for "active" medical holders (Le., more than zero flight hours per year).
^Source: CAMFs Aeromedical Certification Statistical Handbook.

techniques, technology) are confounded with age changes within individuals. Cultural
changes (e.g., communication techniques) can occur in a decade or so, and technological
changes which may also influence performance can occur almost overnight. The
technological issue raises another question as to whether or not transitioning from an
older aircraft (e.g., DC-9, B-727) to a new state-of-the-art airliner (e.g., the highly
automatized B-767) represents a problem for the older generations1 transitioning, because
of the advanced computers that virtually fly the airplanes by themselves. However,
Mohler (1981) strongly suggested that there is no evidence that older pilots have more
trouble transitioning to new aircraft than younger pilots.

ANALYSIS

The data were separated into categories for the evaluation (e.g., Class HI hours
were kept with private pilots, Class II hours were kept with commercial pilots, and Class I
hours were kept with ATPs). In regards to the accident statistics, an age-related trend is
noticeable in a majority of the figures. This trend shows a decrease in accident statistics
with increasing age, reaching minimum values between 40-49 years of age, and then
increasing slightly through the 50s.
The data in the following figures represent calculated totals of pilot flight time,
number of accidents, and number of active pilots as acquired from the specified aviation
data banks. The source data are presented in Appendix E. Figure 2 represents the annual
flight hours per pilot by class of medical certificate. The annual hours flown for first class
holders reach a peak around 609 hours per year for the 25-29 year age group and maintain
a level plateau through the 55-59 year age group; then, the number of reported flight hours
rapidly decline for the 60-64 and 65-69 year age groups. It can reasonably be assumed that
this sharp decline is a direct result of the Age 60 Rule; besides, there are not many reasons
for a pilot age 60 or older to get afirstclass certificate, especially if he/she is not entitled to
its privileges. The annual hours flown for second class holders remain relatively stable at
around 190 hours per year for all age groups. In contrast, the reported flight hours for
third class holders steadily increase with age; beginning with a low of 26 hours per year for
the 20-24 year age group to a high of 65 hours per year for the 65-69 year age group.
The remainingfiguresshow the accident statistics by the type of license held, and
the type of operation. Figures 3 and 4 represent accident records for ATPs and
commercial pilots. The accident data depicted in thesefiguresindicate increasing safety
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Figure 2. Annual Hours Flown per Pilot by Medical Certificate (1982-1988).
Source: COMSIS Research Corporation

through the late 40s; e.g., the accident record per 1,000 active ATPs startsfroma high of
11.71 for the 20-24 year age group, declines to a low of 2.88 for the 45-49 year age
group, and then climbs to 3.78 for the 55-59 year age group. The 3.78 figure for the 5559 year age group compares favorably with the 3.77 figure for the 35-39 year age group
(see Figure 3). The accident records per 1,000 active ATPs and commercial pilots both
show similar patterns (see Figures 3 and 4). Accident records are highest for the youngest
group (i.e., the 20-24 year age group), then progressively decline and reach a low for the
45-49 year age group, afterward there is a slight increase for the 50-54 and 55-59 year age
groups. However, with both the ATP and the commercial pilot groups, the 50-59 year
old pilots have lower accident records than the 30-39 year age groups.
In marked contrast, Figures 5 and 6 show that the accident record per 1,000 active
pilots, for both private pilots and airline pilots, is lowest for the youngest group, and then
progressively increases up to the 55-59 year age group. For example, the accident record
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Figure 3. Accident Records for Air Transport Pilots (1982-1988). Source: NTSB
Accident Data Division & FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation
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Figure 4. Accident Records for Commercial Pilots (1983-1986). Source: NTSB
Accident Data Division & FAA rs Slalislical Handbook on Aviation
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Figure 5. Accident Records for Private Pilots (1982-1987). Source: AOPA
Air Safely Database & FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation
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Figure 6. Accident Records for Airline Pilots (1982-1988). Source: NTSB
Accident Data Division & FAA's Aeromedical Certification Statistical Handbook

per 1,000 active private pilots starts at a low of 2.63 for the 20-24 year age group, and
increases in a linear fashion to 4.97 for the 55-59 year age group. However, the accident
data in Figures 3 through 6 do not consider exposure (i.e., the number of hours flown).
Accident statistics based on exposure data (i.e., accidents per 100,000 annual hours
flown) for the different pilot groups present a different picture. Figures 7, 8, and 9
represent accident rates for ATPs, commercial pilots, and private pilots. An examination
and comparison of these three figures indicates the presence of a common age-related
pattern: increasing safety through the 40s with a slight decrease in the late 50s; e.g., the
accident rate per 100,000 annual hours flown for ATPs starts from a high of 2.74 for the
20-24 year age group, declines to a low of 0.48 for the 45-49 year age group and then
climbs to 0.63 for the 55-59 year age group. The 0.63 figure for the 55-59 year age group
again compares favorably with the 0.66 figure for the 35-39 year age group (see Figure 7).
All three figures (ATPs, commercial pilots, and private pilots) show that active pilots in
their 50s have lower accident rates than pilots in their 20s and 30s.
Accidents per 100,000 Annual Hours Flown by A T P s

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

50-54

55-59

Pilot Age Groups

Figure 7. Accident Rates for Air Transport Pilots (ATPs) Using First Class
Annual Hours (1982-1988). Source: NTSB Accident Data Division, FAA's
Statistical Handbook on Aviation, & COMSIS Research Corporation
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Figure 8. Accident Rates for Commercial Pilots Using Second Class Annual
Hours (1983-1986). Source: NTSB Accident Data Division, FAA's Statistical
Handbook on Aviation, &. COMSIS Research Corporation
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Figure 9. Accident Rates for Private Pilots Using Third Class Annual Hours
(1982-1987). Source: AOPA Air Safely Database, FAA's Slalislical Handbook
on Aviation, & COMSIS Research Corporation

The relationship between the number of "pilot error" or pilot caused accidents as a
percentage of the total number of accidents was also examined. This data is somewhat
unique as compared to the other accident statistics because it includes pilots age 60 and
over. Figures 10 and 12 show the percentage of accidents classified as pilot error for
ATPs and general aviation operators. Both figures show the percentage of accidents
classified as pilot error decreasing slightly with age, suggesting that pilots in their 50s
and evens 60s are less likely to experience a pilot error accident, as compared to those
pilots in their 20s and 30s (i.e., with the exception of the 60-64 year old ATPs and 70-79
year old general aviation pilots). However, in contrast, Figure 11 shows that the older
commercial pilots are the ones more likely to experience a pilot error accident; however,
the differences are quite small until pilots reach their 60s. Nevertheless, all three figures
consistently illustrate the importance of experience as inferredfromthe type of license
held; i.e., ATPs have the highest levels of flight time followed by commercial pilots and
then general aviation pilots. For the time period specified, pilots possessing an ATP
certificate have a 61.3% chance of an accident being classified as pilot error, as compared
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Figure 10. Percentage of Accidents Classified as Pilot Error
for Air Transport Pilots (1982-1988). Source: NTSB Accident
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Figure 12. Percentage of Accidents Classified as Pilot Caused
for General Aviation Operators (1982-1987). Source: AOPA
Air Safety Database

to 74.4% and 77.5% chance for commercial pilots and general aviation operators,
respectively.
The Chi-squared (x2) statistical technique was selected to evaluate particular data
in order to test the hypothesis advanced. The x 2 is a nonparametric test of significance
appropriate when data are in the form of frequency measures (e.g., number of observed
accidents). The x 2 goodness-of-fit test determines whether a statistically significant
difference exists between the proportions observed and the proportions expected. As can
be seen from the formula, the x 2 value dramatically increases as the difference between
the the observed and expected frequencies increase.

Formula:

%2 = J

^

Where: O is the number of accidents observed, and
E is the expected number of accidents based
on the pilot population.

The calculated results of x 2 can be seen in Tables 6, 7, and 8. Using p=.001 the
X2 = 24.32 and 22.46, with d/=7 and d/=6, respectively. Because the observed x 2
values are larger than is required at the/?=.001 level, it is concluded that the differences
between the observed and expected frequencies are significant across three groups of
pilots beyond the .001 level; therefore, the null hypothesis that aging has no effect on
pilot performance capabilities as inferredfromthe observed-over-expected frequency of
accidents is rejected. However, the trends across the three groups were inconsistent. In
Tables 6 and 7, the data for commercial pilots and ATPs shows that the significant x2ts
are because the younger pilots age 20-39 experienced more accidents than expected, and
the older pilots age 40-59 generally had fewer accidents than expected. However, in
Table 8, the older airline pilots age 45-59 appear to have had a significantly greater

Table 6. Chi-Squared Test Results Using Commercial Pilot Data
(1983-1986)
Pilot Age
Groups

Number of
Pilots

Observed
Accidents (O)

Expected
Accidents (E)

(O-E)

(0-E) 2 /E

20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59

35,773
71,012
69,993
93,920
95,444
73,759
60,785
42,230

380
613
672
877
653
467
427
323

290.71
577.08
568.80
763.24
775.62
599.40
493.97
343.18

89.29
35.92
103.20
113.76
-122.62
-132.40
-66.97
-20.18

27.43
2.24
18.73
16.96
19.39
29.25
9.08
1.19

Total
542,916
4,412
4,412
0.00
Source: NTSB Accident Data Division & FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation

124.24

Table 7. Chi-Squared Test Results Using Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Data
(1982-1988)
Pilot Age
Groups

Number of
Pilots

Observed
Accidents (O)

Expected
Accidents (E)

(O-E)

(0-E) 2 /E

20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59

3,757
43,706
86,841
107,338
101,536
89,229
69,930
42,884

44
243
357
405
319
257
232
162

13.91
161.85
321.58
397.48
376.00
330.42
258.96
158.80

30.09
81.15
35.42
7.52
-57.00
-73.42
-26.96
3.20

65.07
40.69
3.90
0.14
8.64
16.32
2.81
0.06

Total
2,019
2,019
0.00
545,221
Source: NTSB Accident Data Division & FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation

137.63

Table 8. Chi-Squared Test Results Using Part 121 (Airline Pilot) Data
(1982-1988)
Pilot Age
Groups

Number of
Pilots

Observed
Accidents (O)

Expected
Accidents (E)

(O-E)

(0-E) 2 /E

25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59

30,800
50,035
57,833
59,726
62,708
44,153
22,406

2
11
7
13
20
19
15

8.18
13.29
15.36
15.86
16.65
11.72
5.95

-6.18
-2.29
-8.36
-2.86
3.35
7.28
9.05

4.67
0.39
4.55
0.52
0.67
4.52
13.77

Total
327,661
87
87
Q.QQ
Source: NTSB Accident Data Division & FAA's Aeromedical Certification Statistical

29.08
Handbook

number of accidents. This result should be interpreted with great caution, since only one
out of the three sets of comparisons yielded this result and the airline pilots have an
extremely low accident rate.

CONCLUSION

The results of this study support the rejection of the null hypothesis that aging has
no measurable effect on pilot performance as inferredfromthe number of accidents among
pilots. The y} analysis indicated that the observed frequency of accidents was
significantly different than the expectedfrequencyamong active pilots. However, the
analysis for airline pilots showed the older pilots age 45-59 had significantly more
accidents than expected. It may be that the PIC factor contributes to this increase in
accidents (e.g., it is likely that there are many more older airline captains than there are
younger ones, and in an accident report, it is the PIC who gets charged with the accident
whether he/she was flying the airplane or not). On the basis of the data presented, it was
determined that there may in fact be some point in a pilot's career (e.g., a threshold level)
after which performance gradually declines. The data presented herein consistently
suggests that this decline occurs in thefifthdecade for the majority of pilots.
Current medical screening procedures seem to be quite effective in eliminating
those pilots who fall below the accepted medical standards. Pilots with medical problems
are screened out of the active population at an increasing rate in association with the more
advanced age groups. However, the validity of this data can be argued to be ambiguous
because the very high number of medical denials of struggling airlines suggests that these
denials could be a result of other factors than aging per se (e.g., management/union
disagreements, political issues). Although much of the physiological and psychological
literature would predict that performance decrements should begin in the late 20s and early
30s, the accident data indicate that the pilot safety records continue to improve through the
40s. This improvement probably indicates that the benefits of experience exceed any of
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the initial effects of aging; however, the effects of age and experience are more complex
and difficult to evaluate and xequire further study.
The high accident statistics observed for younger pilots 20-24 years old,
particularly among ATPs and commercial pilots, could be a result of other factors rather
than their limitedflightexperience. These younger pilots, particularly those who work for
commuter airlines, usually get the least desireable and most hazardous routes from the
airline bidding process because of their low seniority. This bidding process also limits
these pilots to the type of aircraft they fly (i.e., new and automated versus old and
antiquated), thus increasing their risk and exposure factors considerably. However, some
of these well-trained younger pilots may be just as safe as the older pilots; but, because the
way our system is set up, the issue as to whether younger pilots are less safe than older
pilots becomes more confounding.
The slight increase in the number of accident statistics involving pilots age 50 and
over suggests that the benefits of experience may have an upper threshold limit. After this
upper limit is reached or exceeded, the effects of age-related decrements appear to impact
the safety record. In contrast, the accident record per 1,000 active private pilots, who as a
group have significantly less flying experience than ATPs and commercial pilots, shows
the type of progressive increase in accidents that would be predicted by the physiological
and psychological literature. It could be that this progressive increase in accidents is a
result of the very limited amount of hours flown by private pilots (i.e., third class holders),
Their recent exposure rate is just too low to really get proficient in theirflyingskills.
However, when the data for private pilots arc adjusted by the number of hours flown, the
safety level increases through the early 40s and then remains relatively stable with a slight
decrease in safety in the late 50s.
The accident data suggest that there is a decrease in the safety and effectiveness of
pilots by age 60. Whether this decrease in the older pilots' safely records is critical or not
is difficult to establish. In comparing the records of the older groups of pilots with the
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younger groups who will be replacing them, the effectiveness of the Age 60 Rule would
appear to be open to question. Compared to pilots in their 40s, the older pilots are
slightly less safe, but compared to the younger pilots who would replace them, they seem
to be slightly better. However, it is difficult to speculate how well the accident statistics
would compare if older pilots were allowed to fly beyond age 60.
The debate as to whether or not older pilots are more at risk because of sudden
incapacitation does not seem to be a major issue. Sudden incapacitation does not appear to
be an age-related problem; it is more frequently associated with food poisoning. It is
interesting to note that the age group most likely to suffer from sudden incapacitqfion (i.e.,
45-49 year olds) is also the age group with the safest accident statistics. However,
whether older pilots are more at risk because of undetected decrements in physical or
mental performance has yet to be determined. The age trends within the data presented
suggest that there are some noticeable changes with increasing age, especially after age 50.
Although the literature suggests that there are a variety of tests which could be used to
determine a pilot's reaction time and cognitive skills, there is very little information
available which relates these measures to actual piloting skills. It is clear from the
literature presented, that progressively fewer older pilots are able to meet the first class
medical standards. Reinhart (1991) stated, " . . . w c become less tolerant to the extremes
of life, especially in theflightenvironment, and wc become unable to maintain the fine
tuning of our skills like we had in the good old days of our youth" (p. 13).
Despite the limitations addressed in this study, the evidence herein raises at least
one point of general importance—the effects of experience may be greater than the effects
of age for pilots between 20 and 49 years of age. Although the amount of recent
experience is perhaps more important toflightsafety than age alone, it was not addressed in
this study because of the complexities in the databases. In addition, the consistent
differences among pilot groups in the accident statistics by age 50 may be partly a result of
factors other than aging alone. Such factors include cohort effects, altitude, motivation to

fly, the fact that accidents are attributed to the PIC who may not necessarily be the one at
the controls, and especially the cross-sectional nature of the study itself.
Summary
The objective of this study was to identify and report the issues relevant to the Age
60 Rule. This study as a whole lends support to the hypothesis advanced that pilot safety
decreases for the most senior age groups (50-59 years old). It was generally observed that
accident rates declined from the 20s through the late 40s, and then gradually increased in
the 50s. There are also some striking similarities between the accident statistics and the
medical issues presented herein; i.e., both show an age-related trend in the fifth decade. In
general, the results show that pilots in their 40s experience the lowest accident rates. The
data suggest that aging effects may outweigh the positive effects of experience in a pilot's
fifth decade.
To this day, the Age 60 Rule remains to be a controversial topic. The medical
issues, as they relate to piloting an aircraft, clearly impact the situation and obviously
favor younger pilots. We must always seek ways to improve aviation safety. In
comparing the records of the older groups of pilots with the younger groups who will be
replacing them, the Age 60 Rule appears to diminish the overall safety level. However, it
is again difficult to fully predict what would happen to the safety level if the current age
limit for airline pilots was increased into the 60s—perhaps the Age 60 Rule would be
supported. We must keep in mind that individual abilities and capacities vary
dramatically. Professionally trained pilots with high levels of experience may in fact be
able to cope with some of their selective sensory and cognitive losses and may also be
capable of maintaining an acceptable safety record even into their sixth or seventh decade.
If the Age 60 Rule were to be changed, what are the alternative options available?
More comprehensive and costly medical exams? More detailed and monitored LOFT
sessions? Even though the results of this study support the notion that older and
experienced pilots are safer than those who will replace them, Reinhart (1991) offered
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some interesting philosophical questions that we should consider. Reinhart queried
whether airline pilots would really want the responsibility of the added burden of more
costly and comprehensive testing and monitoring merely to fly for just a few more years,
keeping in mind the ever present possibility of not meeting new standards at some
unexpected point in time. "Or is it more prudent to plan for a stated age, continue to
accept the present standards, and have more control of when to expect retirement for pilot
and company?" (p. 17). At the present time, the Age 60 Rule remains to be a conservative
approach to the aging and safety issues; however, the rule could very well be
counterproductive by retiring our most seasoned and experienced pilots and replacing
them with much younger and less qualified pilots. Nevertheless, it is presumed that until
more advanced cognitive screening techniques are developed and validated, the rule will
most likely remain unchanged.
Recommendations
The accident statistics for pilots age 60 and over could not be calculated as initially
expected. These pilots are not specifically represented in the FAA's database. For
example, the FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation lists the upper age group for license
holders (i.e., private, commercial, and ATPs) as 60+. Since there are many more older
active pilots today, as compared to previous years (Mohler, 1986), it should be
recommended that these pilots be accounted for until at least 65-69. This will allow future
studies to benefit and utilize this data in order to get accurate statistics for these pilots as
well, and to see if the trends increase even more beyond age 60.
Additional research with improved methodology (e.g., actual flying hours rather
than medical class hours) is necessary before authoritative conclusions can be reached
concerning the effects of age and experience onflightsafety. The optimal means of
determining whether there are any significant age decrements among older pilots is to
conduct a longitudinal study; although very costy, a longitudinal study utilizing state-ofthe-art technologies and appropriate measures of pilot performance would provide very

beneficial information, therefore it is strongly recommended. It is also suggested that
future studies use a recent time interval (e.g., just those pilots with >600 annual hours) in
order to study the effects of recency and age on accident rates. For example, many of the
ATPs and airline pilots involved in accidents often had more than 600 hours per year, as
compared to some private pilots with only 30 hours per year.
Furthermore, there are highly advanced modern simulators that can duplicate reallife conditions along with the aircraft characteristics. These training devices should be
able to screen out or at least identify pilot performance decrements objectively provided
that standardized test and evaluation procedures can be agreed upon. Sterns et al. (1985)
found that psychological tests designed to identify subtle changes in cognitive functioning
have not been systematically administered to pilots. It would be useful to design future
studies utilizing these psychological tests in order to help assess pilot performance
involving complex tasks. Additionally, Salthouse (1987) stated, "Since accident
avoidance behaviors often demand maximum response, tests should include demanding as
well as moderate tasks" (p. 720). Future studies should also attempt to validate the use of
LOFT and other assessment techniques on subjects that are current and proficient in their
flying skills, particularly airline pilots where a high level of knowledge and skill is
essential. Although, some literature (e.g., Salthouse) has already supported the
development of screening and assessment approaches for airline pilots over 60 in order to
identify those individuals who may be experiencing or who have already experienced
some age-related changes that may reduce their functional level of skills.
The physiological and psychological literature adequately documents the evidence
that human cognitive and sensory capabilities begin to decline in the late 20s. The accident
data indicate that pilot safety continues to improve into the late 40s. Just how these agerelated effects and experience alter pilot capacities is not well understood. This area is
fruitful with opportunities for future research topics which should attempt to get a better
understanding of these age-related effects on the pilot population.
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Subpart M—Airman and
Crewmember Requirements
SOURCE: Docket No. 6258, 29 FR 19212,
Dec. 31, 1964, unless otherwise noted.

§ 121.381 Applicability.
This subpart prescribes airman and
crewmember requirements for all certificate holders.
§ 121.383 Airman: Limitations on use of
services.
(a) No certificate holder may use
any person as an airman nor may any
person serve as an airman unless t h a t
personCD Holds an appropriate current
airman certificate issued by the FAA;
(2) Has any required appropriate
current airman and medical certificates in his possession while engaged
in operations under this part; and
(3) Is otherwise qualified for the operation for which he is to be used.
(b) Each airman covered by paragraph (a)(2) of this section shall
present either or both certificates for
inspection upon the request of the Administrator.
(c) No certificate holder may use the
services of any person as a pilot on an
airplane engaged in operations under
this part if that person has reached
his 60th birthday. No person may
serve as a pilot on an airplane engaged
in operations under this part if t h a t
person has reached his 60th birthday.
[Doc. No. 6258, 29 FR 19212, Dec. 31, 1964,
as amended by Amdt. 121-144, 43 FR 22646,
May 25, 1978]

Note. From Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14 (p. 436), 1990, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.

APPENDIX B
LETTERS FROM FOREIGN NATIONS ON PILOT AGE LIMITATIONS
(AUSTRALIA, FINLAND, GERMANY, MEXICO,
NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY, UNITED KINGDOM)

75

Qyran

Civil Aviation Authority
•

G.P.OBox367
Canberra
ACT 2501
Australia
Telephone: (062) 684111
Telex: 62221
FAX: (062) 485239

Mr P a t r i c k C Guide
Box 1391
Embry-Riddle A e r o n a u t i c a l U n i v e r s i t y
DAYTONA BEACH FLORIDA 32114-3900
Dear Mr Guide
Your letter of 16 August 1990 to Senator the Hon Bob Collins,
Minister for Shipping and Aviation Support, has been referred to
the Civil Aviation Authority for reply.
You sought information on upper age limits for pilots in
Australia. In respect of non-commercial operations, I can
advise that there is no upper age limit applied to pilots,
provided they satisfy the medical standards appropriate to the
level of licence held.
For commercial and higher category licences there is also no
upper age limit, but there are limitations placed upon pilots
who have attained the age of 60 years. I have enclosed copies
of the relevant Civil Aviation Orders which set out these
limitations.
I trust this information will be of some assistance to you.

A E HEGGEN
Group General Manager
Safety Regulation
October 1990
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f=/NNPJ/R
Flight

Department/U.

Koskela/tm

14 December 1990

Patrick C. Guide
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University
Box 1391
Daytona Beach, FL 32114-3900
USA

Your letter

of 27 August 1990

UPPER AGE LIMITS
I am sorry for our late
The upper age limits

reply.

are as follows:

Type of licence

upper age

limit

Private pilot's
licence
Commercial pilot's
licence
Air Trafffic pilot's
licence

no age limit
60 years
60 years

These limits are valid if there is no medical reasons to
cancel the pilot's
licence
earlier.
With best regards,
FINNAIR
Flight Department

x

Urpb Koskela
Chief Pilot

Postilokero
Helsinki-Vantaan Lentoasema
PL 68-69
01531 VANTAA

Helsinki Airport
PL 68-69
01531 VANTAA
FINLAND

Puhelin - Telephone

Telex

Telefax

Keskus - Exchange
(90) 818 51
Ohivalinta - Direct Line (90) 818..

124396

(90) 818 6700

Luftfahrt-Bundesamt
Au6enst«11« Berlin

Referat Flugmedizin
luftfafcrt-lmitfisiat A*flt«ittM( I t r l U
riiufcafxt . 0-1189 | « r l In-Sch B«c r • 1 d

Hr. Patrick C. Guide
170 Iron Gate Circle
Port Orange, FL 32119
USA

Ihre Zeictan und Nachncht vo»n

07- 09. 1990

(Dill* bet Anlworl angcbon)
Un»«/* ZAICIMM

B 23l7dr.do-gr

unser* Ourchwuhi

672 4 0 2 7

Berlin-SchOnefeld

06.

11 .

#1990

Tgb.-IIr. ik9

Dear Ur. Guide,
Please excuse my late response.
Hr. Krupper handed me your letter dated Sep. 7th 1990
regarding your study relating changes in flying safety as
a function of pilot age.
In the former GDR there was no regulation concerning a upper
age limit of 60 years however we only know about two pilots
of this age.
The age - criteria v/hich terminated an aviators career were
the medical regulations for Licensing only.
A study performed by INTERFLUG has indicated, that older pilots
were not involved in more accidents, failures or inflight incapacitations then younger pilots.
Further indepth information could possitly be received from
INTERFLUG.
Ilany g/eetings

Dr/ Dollny

Dienststelle:

Berlin-SchOnefeld f l u g h a f e n , Telefon (00372)6720
Telefax (00372)6788216
Telex 112891 oifvzk
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DIRECCION GEKERAL DE AEROKAUTICA CIVIL
DIRECCION TECNICA Y DE SUPERVISION

36232

101.204.-237
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Mexico, D.F., 3 de octubre de 1990.
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PATRICK C. GUIDE
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Box 1391
Daytona Beach, FL 32114-3900
U.S.A.
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En relacion a su atenta de fecha 27 de agosto proximo pasado,roepermito
informarle que en nuestro Pais no existe restriccion legal por edad a ningun piloto para volar en la aviacion general, el unico requisito es que pasen los examenes medicos establecidos por la Direccion General de
Medicina Preventiva en el Transporte a traves de la Subdireccion de Medl
cina- de Aviacion, los cuales son mas rigurosos en ciertos aspectos que los normales de otro Pais, sin embargo algunos erapleadores no aceptan —
pilotos mayores de 60 anos. Por otra parte en convenios contractuales celebrados entre la Asociacion Sindical de Pilotos Aviadores de Mexico,
Mexicana de Aviacion, Aerovias de Mexico y otras pequenas companlas de lineas aereas, se ha fijado la fecha maxima para prestar servicios hasta
la edad de 60 anos a los cuales deberan retirarse protegidos con programas de retiro o jubilacion.
Los pilotos eliminados por causas medicas son indemnizados de acuerdo a_
los Contratos firmados con la Asociacion Sindical de'Pilotos y sumadas a
las senaladas por la Ley Federal del Trabajo de nuestro Pais.

=0

m

Esperando que la informacion sea de utilidad.

C=

Atentamente .
SUFRAGIO EFECTIVO. NO REELECCION.
EL DIRECTOR GENERAL.
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ENRIQUE ZAPATA B

WtfCflS* -vf*;. ;. <;;,.„.,,

••'A ,-JV:

:

CAP. FBT*ahp.

• '..•.;'.'?u tf umumiti en
••• i - K v O

.^
Ofir.-v-.

E NTRAD/

'
.

....,..,....,.„,
"•*•' • *5|MiVS

79

General Direction of Civil Aeronautic
Technical and Supervisory Direction

Mexico, D.F., October 3,1990

In relation to your courteous letter dated August 27, may I inform you that in our country
there are no legal restrictions due to age for pilots in order to fly in general aviation, the
only requirement is that they pass the medical exams established by the General OfQce of
Preventative Medicine in Transportation through the subdivision of Aviation Medicine.
These exams are more rigorous in certain aspects than the regular exams from other
countries, notwithstanding some companies do not accept pilots older than 60 years of age.
On the other hand, in negotiations between the Pilots Association of Mexico and the two
largest air carriers of Mexico, along with the other smaller airlines, it has been established
that the latest date to fly will be at the age of 60 at which time the pilot should retire with a
pension program.
Those pilots that are eliminated for medical reasons are paid in accordance with the
contracts signed by the Pilots Association and in accordance to the pertaining Federal Labor
Regulations of our country.
I hope this information will be useful for you.

Sincerely.

General Director
Enrique Zapata B.
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OFFICE OF AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

31 August 1990
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Daytona Beach, FL 32114-3900
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Dear Mr Guide
Reference your letter of 16 August.
Herewith the data re age and experience of pilots involved in
accidents to fixed wing powered aircraft from 1983 - 1987.
There is no upper age limit for pilots in New Zealand.
An aviator's career is terminated if he develops a medical
condition for which a waiver cannot be issued.
The cost of the enclosed printout, time and postage is US$36.
Yours faithfully

R Chippindale
Chief Inspector of Air Accidents
Encl

14TH FLOOR. INVESTMENT HOUSE. CNR BALLANCE & FEATHERSTON ST. WELLINGTON
PO Box 1210 Wellington

Telephone (04) 733-112
Fa« (04) 499-1510

Telex NZ 30630
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Patrick C. Guide,
170 Iron Gate Circle
Port Orange, FL 32119,
USA.

24th Sept 1990

Vir referanse

90/06109

741

Deres dato

900829

Deres referanse

Letter

STATISTICS IN REGARDS TO AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS IN NORWAY.
Thank you for your letter about the above mentioned
statistics.
We are sorry to inform you that we do not have any
information about changes in flying status as a function
of pilot age.
All private pilots are able to fly as long as they have
valid medical papers and satisfy our minimum flying hours
per year, or have passed a two-yearly PFT (Periodic Flight
Training).
Commercial pilots have to stop flying internationally when
they reach the age of 60 years.
Certainly, pilots may also end their career if they have any
kind of serious illness that prohibit further flying.
This is according to international rules and regulationes.
This is also an answer of your letter to SAS about the same
subject.
Yours sincerely

Yi^-,
Tor B. Kirkvaag,
Chief Inspector.
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Civil Aviation Authority
Safety Regulation Group
3W
Aviation House
South Area
Gatwick Airport
Gatwick
West Sussex RH6 0YR
Tel: Switchboard 0293 567171
Telex: 878753 Fax: 0293 573999
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Mr Patrick C Guide
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Daytona Beach
FL 32114-3900

Our Ref: 10MG/03/01/10
VP:JH725
23 August, 1990

Thank you for your further letter dated 16 August 1990, regarding upper
age limits for pilots and aviators careers.
There is no upper age limit for the holders of Private Pilots Licences
(PPL).
However, there is an increase in the frequency of medical
examination:
Under 40
40 - 50
50 - 70
Over 70

60 months
24 months
12 months
6 months

The privileges of Professional Pilot Licence holders are restricted in
respect of Public Transport at 60 years of age to require him/her to fly
as a member of a crew of 2-pilots or more and then only in aircraft with
a Maximum Total Weight Authorised not exceedidng 20,000 kg.
A
Professional Pilot Licence holder cannot fly for Public Transport when
aged 65 years or more.
A Professional Pilot Licence holder can
otherwise fly any aircraft included in his licence up to any age
provided he remains fit and can qualify for a medical certificate.
The Authority has no say in the employment of pilots or their career
structure.
I hope this information is sufficient, please do not hesitate to write
to me again.

_§A**£
Miss J Harris
Management Support

Unit
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APPENDIX C
H.R. 3498

I

1 0 1 S T CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3498

To amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to limit the age restrictions imposed
upon aircraft pilots.

IN THE HOUSE OF EEPEESENTATIVES
OCTOBER 19,

1989

Mr. LIGHTFOOT (for himself, Mr. BALLENGEE, Mr. CHAPMAN, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr.
EMEESON, Mr. HANCOCK, Mr. HAYES of Illinois, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. LAUGHLIN, Mr. PACKAED, Mr. DENNY SMITH, Mr. HASTEET, Mr. GEANT, Mr.
JONES of Georgia, and Mr. PAYNE of Virginia) introduced the following bill;

which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

A BILL
To amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to limit the age
restrictions imposed upon aircraft pilots.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3
4

5

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AGE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED
UPON AIRCRAFT PILOTS.

Section 602(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49

6 U.S.C. 1422(b)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the
7 following new paragraph:

2
1

"(3) LIMITATION ON AGE RESTRICTIONS.—The

2

Administrator shall not, solely by reason of the age of

3

a person, if such person is less than 65 years of age—

4

"(A) refuse to issue an airman certificate to,

5

or refuse to renew such certificate for, such

6

person, if such person is applying for the issuance

7

or renewal of such certificate in order to serve or

8

continue to serve as a pilot of an aircraft; or

9

"(B) require an air carrier to terminate the

10

employment of, or refuse to employ, such person

11

as a pilot on an aircraft of such air carrier.".
O

«HR

s^m
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APPENDIX D
PUBLIC LAW 96-171

PUBLIC LAW 96-171—DEC. 29, 1979

93 STAT. 12S5

Public Law 96-171
96th Congress
An Act
To require a study of the desirability of mandatory age retirement for certain pilots,
and Tor other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled, That the Director of
the National Institutes of Health, in consultation with the Secretary
of Transportation, shall conduct a study to determine—
(1) whether an age limitation which prohibits all individuals
who are sixty years of age or older from serving as pilots is
medically warranted;
(2) whether an age limitation which prohibits all individuals
who are older than a particular age from serving as pilots is
medically warranted;
(S) whether rules governing eligibility for first- and secondclass medical certification, as set forth in part 67 of title 14 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the date of enactment
of this Act), are adequate to determine an individual's physical
condition in light of existing medical technology;
(4) whether rules governing the frequency of first- and secondclass medical examinations, as set forth in part 67 of title 14 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the date of
enactment of this Act), are adequate to assure that an individual's physical condition is being satisfactorily monitored; and
(5) tne effect of aging on the ability of individuals to perform
the duties of pilots with the highest level of safety.
The Director shall complete such study and submit a report oT the
results thereof to Congress within one year after the date of enactment of this Act. In conducting such study the Director shall utilize
all available studies and data which are relevant to such study.
SEC. 2. No funds are authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal
year commencing October 1, 1979, in addition to funds otherwise
available to carry out the study described in section 1 of this Act
Approved December 29,1979.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY;
HOUSE REPORT No. 96-474 (Comm. on Public Works and Transportation).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Vol. 125 (1979):
Dec 5, considered and parsed House.
Dec. 18. considered and pas»ed Senate, amended.
Dec 19, House concurred in Senate amendment.

Sl-lJt O - »0 (21))

A-3

Dec. 29.1379
[H.R. 3948J
Pilots, study of
mandatory age
retirement.
49 USC 1421
note.

14 CFR Part 67.

Report to
Congress.

Appropriation
authorization.

APPENDIX E
ACCIDENT STATISTICS FOR AIR TRANSPORT PILOTS (ATPs),
COMMERCIAL PILOTS, PRIVATE PILOTS, PART 121 OPERATORS,
AND GENERAL AVIATION OPERATORS

Table E-1. Accident Statistics for Air Transport Pilots (1982-1988)
20-24
3,757

25-29
43,706

30-34
86,841

35-39
107,338

40-44
101,536

45-49
89,229

50-54
69,930

55-59
42,884

60 +
41,561

TOTAL
586,782

% of ATPs

0.64

7.45

14.80

18.29

17.30

15.21

11.92

7.31

7.08

100

1,000s of ATPs

3.76

43.71

86.84

107.34

101.54

89.23

69.93

42.88

41.56

586.78

44

243

357

405

319

257

232

162

162

2,181

ATP Accidents Expected

13.96

162.45

322.78

398.96

377.40

331.65

259.92

159.39

154.48

2,181

Avg. Flight Houis/Pilot
(Class I holders)0

427.1

608.7

572.3

575.9

571.0

594.4

606.2

598.9

383.0

575.7

100,000 Annual Eight Hours

16.0

266.0

497.0

618.2

579.8

530.4

423.9

256.8

198.7

2,953.0

Observed/Expected

3.15

1.50

1.11

1.02

0.85

0.77

0.89

1.02

1.05

1.00

Accident Record (accidents
per 1,000 pilots)

11.71

5.56

4.11

3.77

3.14

2.88

3.32

3.78

3.90

3.72

Accident Rate (accidents per
100,000 hours)

2.74

0.91

0.72

0.66

0.55

0.48

0.55

0.63

0.82

0.74

No.ofATPs

2

ATP Accidents Observedb

a

FAA 's Statistical Handbook on Aviation
^NTSB Accident Data Division
c
COMSIS Research Corporation data for "active"firstclass holders

Table E-2. Accident Statistics for Commercial Pilots (1983-1986)
25-29
71,012

30-34
69,993

% of Commercial Pilots

5.82

11.56

11.40

15.29

15.54

12.01

9.90

6.88

11.60

100

1,000s of Commercial Pilots

35.77

71.01

69.99

93.92

95.44

73.76

60.79

42.23

71.24

614.15

Commercial Pilot Accidents
Observed^

380

613

672

877

653

467

427

323

358

4,770

Commercial Pilot Accidents
Expected

277.84

551.53

543.62

729.46

741.29

572.87

472.10

327.99

553.29

4,770

Avg. Flight Hours/Pilot
(Class II holders)0

155.3

169.5

184.1

205.5

200.3

1943

187.8

190.4

183.1

167.0

100,000 Annual Right Hours

55.5

120.4

128.8

193.0

191.1

143.3

114.2

80.4

130.4

1,025.7

Observed/Expected

1.37

1.11

1.24

1.20

0.88

0.82

0.90

0.98

0.65

1.00

Accident Record (accidents per
1,000 pilots)

10.62

8.63

9.60

9.34

6.84

6.33

7.02

7.65

5.03

7.77

6.84

5.09

5.22

4.54

3.42

3.26

3.74

4.02

2.74

4.65

No. of Commercial Pilots

Accident Rate (accidents per
1100,000 hours)
a

35-39 | 40-44 | 45-49
93,920
95,444
73,759

50-54
60,785

20-24
35,773

3

FAA 's Statistical Handbook on Aviation
NTSB Accident Data Division
°COMSIS Research Corporation data for "active" second class holders
b

55-59 | 60 +
71,238
42,230

TOTAL 1
614,154

Table E-3. Accident Statistics for Private Pilots (1982-1987)
20-24
148,521

25-29
222,803

30-34
274,569

35-39
277,461

40-44
242,969

45-49
194,650

50-54
175,205

55-59
158,070

TOTAL
1,694,248

8.77

13.15

16.21

16.38

14.34

11.49

10.34

9.33

100

1,000s of Private pilots

148.52

222.80

27457

277.46

242.97

194.65

175.21

158.07

1694.25

Private Pilot Accidents
Observed0

391

652

1,004

1,042

1,001

904

843

786

6,623

Private Pilot Accidents
Expected

580.58

870.96

1,073.32

1,084.63

949.79

760.91

684.90

617.91

6,623

Avg. Flight Hours/Pilot
(Class m holders)0

26.1

30.9

38.1

46.7

54.7

60.2

62.6

63.7

48.3

100,000 Annual Flight Hours

38.8

68.8

104.6

129.6

132.9

117.2

109.7

100.6

817.8

Observed/Expected

0.67

0.75

0.94

0.96

1.05

1.19

1.23

1.27

1.00

' Accident Record (accidents per
1,000 pilots)

2.63

2.93

3.66

3.76

4.12

4.64

4.81

4.97

3.91

Accident Rate (accidents per
1100,000 hours)

10.09

9.47

9.60

8.04

7.53

7.71

7.69

7.81

8.10

No. of Private pilots

3

% of Private pilots

a

FAA 's Statistical Handbook on Aviation
AOPA Air Safety Database
c
COMSIS Research Corporation data for "active" third class holders
b

Table E-4. Accident Statistics for Airline Pilots (1982-1988)
25-29
30,800

30-34

35-39
57,833

40-44

45-49

50-54

55-59

50,035

59,726

62,708

44,153

22,406

TOTAL
327,661

9.40

15.27

17.65

18.23

19.14

13.48

6.84

100

1,000s of Airline Pilots

30.80

50.04

57.83

59.73

62.71

44.15

22.41

327.66

Airline Pilot Accidents
Observed0

2

11

7

13

20

19

15

87

Airline Pilot Accidents
Expected

8.18

13.29

15.36

15.86

16.65

11.72

5.95

87

Avg. Flight Hours/Pilot
(Class I holders)0

608.7

572.3

575.9

571.0

594.4

606.2

598.9

589.6

100,000 Annual Flight Hours

187.5

286.4

333.1

341.0

372.7

267.7

134.2

1,932.0

Observed/Expected

0.24

0.83

0.46

0.82

1.20

1.62

2.52

1.00

Accident Record (accidents per
1,000 pilots)

0.06

0.22

0.12

0.22

0.32

0.43

0.67

0.27

0.011

0.038

0.021

0.038

0.054

0.071

0.112

0.045

No. of Airline Pilots3
% of Airline Pilots

Accident Rate (accidents per
100,000 hours)
a

I

CAMI,s Aeromedical Certification Statistical Handbook
^NTSB Accident Data Division
c
COMSIS Research Corporation data for "active"firstclass holders

j

!

Table E-5. Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Accidents Qassified as
Pilot Error (1982-1988)
Pilot
Age
Groups

Number
of ATP
Accidents

Number of
"Pilot Error"
Accidents

Percent of
Accidents Classified
as "Pilot Error"

20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69

44
243
357
405
319
257
232
162
124
38

33
151
223
248
202
144
137
93
84
21

75.0
62.1
62.5
61.2
63.3
56.0
59.1
57.4
67.7
55.3

TOTAk

uu

3U336

tit*

Source: NTSB Accident Data Division

Table E-6. Commercial Pilot Accidents Classified as Pilot Error
(1983-1986)

1

Pilot
Age
Groups

Number of
Commercial
Pilot Accidents

Number of
"Pilot Error"
Accidents

Percent of
Accidents Classified
as "Pilot Error"

20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69

380
613
672
877
653
467
427
323
257
101

293
448
471
624
501
353
327
242
206
84

77.1
73.1
70.1
71.2
76.7
75.6
76.6
74.9
80.2
83.2

TOTAL

4J70

$M9

744

Source: NTSB Accident Data Division
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Table E-7. General Aviation Accidents Classified as Pilot Caused
(1982-1987)
Pilot
Age
Groups

Number of
General Aviation
Accidents

Number of
"Pilot Caused"
Accidents

Percent of
Accidents Classified
as "Pilot Caused"

16-19
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70-79

214
2,793
4,358
3,630
2,819
1,206
200

178
2,193
3,366
2,833
2,165
895
159

83.2
78.5
77.2
78.0
76.8
74.2
79.5

15,220

1139

IIS

JL \ir Xj^VJLi

.•

Source: AOPA Air Safely Database

Table E-8. Flight Hour Distribution by Medical Certificate (1982-1988)
Pilot
Age
Groups

Number of
First Class
Holders

First Class
Total Flight
Hours

Annual Hours
per First
Class Holder

Number of
Second Class
Holders

Second Class
Total Flight
Hours

Annual Hours
per Second
Class Holder

Number of
Third Class
Holders

Third Class
Total Flight
Hours

Annual Hours
per Third
Class Holder

20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59

Subtotal

20,486
48,948
63,224
69,877
71,757
70,652
53,099
24,117
4B&M

8,749,648
29,793,969
36,181,346
40,244,200
40,972,145
41,998,712
32,186,136
14,444,590
244^70,746

427.1
608.7
572.3
575.9
571.0
594.4
606.2
598.9
57SUJ

53,956
73,015
82,490
102,094
95,195
74,374
62,079
40,178
583,361

8,461,349
12,723,406
15,479,632
21,199,709
19,646,455
14,776,983
11,878,318
7,736,850
111^02>702

156.8
174.3
187.7
207.6
206.4
198.7
191.3
192.6
191*8

157,930
215,035
245,900
243,138
216,215
177,783
159,571
118,827
1,534,399

4,134,468
6,653354
9,394,306
11,370,428
11,835,156
10,740,408
10,005,544
7,571,636
71,705^06

262
30.9
38.2
46.8
54.7
60.4
62.7
63.7
4tt

60-64
65-69

11,158
1,548

5,333,372
445,639

478.0
287.9

49,478
19,950

9,196,933
3,062,826

185.9
153.5

122,561
47,545

7,869,178
3,067,876

64.2
64.5

WTAL

434,866

25o,m?$7

575.7

$$2£A5>

mio,4«

iwu

JU704,$0$

ztMtsm

4Z&

Source: COMSIS Research Corporation for active airmen with >0 hours per year
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